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JANUARY-MARCH 2025 QUARTERLY ROUND-UP

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By: Abhinav Patel, A.P Vyas, Arnav Kaushik, Noopur Yadav, Pallakshi Pandya, Pragya Tomer, Saara Gaur, Sukaina Naqvi

JANUARY

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • The Updated SIAC Rules 2025 Aimed at Modernising and Streamlining Arbitral Proceedings. 

The update to Singapore International Arbitration Centre’s Arbitration Rules came into force on 1 January 2025. The SIAC also announced revisions to its Schedule of Fees and introduced a number of changes to advance cost efficiency, procedural efficacy, and maintain arbitral integrity. The introduction of Preliminary Protective Orders (“PPOs”) marks a significant development in emergency arbitration (“EA”). Under Schedule 1, parties can seek ex parte interim relief without notifying the counterparty. PPOs must be decided upon by the arbitrators within 24 hours of appointment and are valid for 14 days, unless regular emergency arbitration proceedings follow.

Modifications were also made in the Expedited Procedure which ensures culmination of arbitral proceedings within 6 months by increasing the financial threshold, broadening its scope. Moreover, Streamlined Procedure has also been introduced, wherein, the award must be issued within 3 months from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal irrespective of whether an oral hearing is held. Notably, the Streamlined Procedure does not provide a cap on the amount of recoverable legal costs. 

The 2025 Rules also allow for consolidation of arbitral proceedings over common questions of law and fact under the same tribunal, include a new set of provisions addressing the appointment of Tribunal Secretaries, require parties to disclose the existence of any third-party funding agreement and explicitly enable a Tribunal to make a final and binding determination of any issue in an arbitration at preliminary stage of the proceedings. These comprehensive revisions mark SIAC’s continued commitment to modernising arbitration to contemporary commercial needs, reinforcing its position as a global leader in efficient arbitration.

In a recent decision of 27 January 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the ruling of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and enforced the parties’ arbitration agreement referring to the arbitration centre under the DIFC-LCIA clause, a joint venture between the Dubai International Financial Centre and the London Court of International Arbitration.

In the overruled judgment, the court ruled that it could not compel Baker Hughes to arbitrate, since the DIFC LCIA forum did not exist anymore and the DIAC was not the same forum in which the parties agreed to arbitrate. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration, holding that the dissolution of the DIFC-LCIA did not render the forum-selection clause unenforceable. The court found that the parties’ agreement remained valid and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Tamara Capeta, Advocate General of the European Court of Justice presented her opinion on the Royal Football Club Seraing v. FIFA and Ors. opining that the arbitral awards by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) involving law of the European Union should be reviewable in total by national courts within the EU. AG Ćapeta distinguishes CAS arbitration from commercial arbitration by highlighting that athletes and clubs are subject to mandatory arbitration under FIFA’s regulations, lacking the voluntary consent foundational to commercial arbitration, thereby justifying broader judicial review under EU law, relying upon Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland. 

While the opinion is not binding but holds persuasive value, her opinion refers to the binding nature of CAS arbitration, making it necessary that these CAS awards are fully reviewed by the competent courts to ensure consistency with EU law. In matters of EU law, these courts are, first, EU domestic courts and the ECJ, not including CAS. She also calls upon the EU courts to review the statutes and regulation of FIFA as they mandatory arbitration through CAS, which limits access to national courts and may allow circumvention of EU law. She also questions the applicability of CAS’ arbitral awards under the New York Convention.

  • Singapore Court Affirms: Non-Participation No Shield Against Unfavourable Arbitral Awards (DEM v DEL [2025] SGCA 1)

The Singapore Court of Appeal held that a party cannot refuse to participate in an arbitration, and thereafter challenge the arbitral award on the ground that the arbitrator failed to acknowledge a fact which was not included in the issue. In upholding the award, the Singapore Courts have established that a party will not be able to evade the consequences of its non-participation in an arbitral proceeding, when a tribunal delivers an unfavourable award that overlooks an issue properly submitted for its consideration. 

This decision aligns with the recent developments in Singapore with respect to the law of notice in arbitration such as the recent case of DBX and another v DBZ [2023] SGHC(I) 18, in which the Singapore International Commercial Court held that even a purported lack of understanding of a notice of arbitration submitted in English would not be considered as a barrier to good notice. This has the significant effect of compelling the challenging party to participate in the arbitration as early as possible.

  • The Qatar International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration’s Updated Rules Now Effective (QICCI Rules)

In a departure from the 2012 Rules, the 2024 Rules introduces Articles 10 and 21, which allow for consolidation of multiple arbitrations and joinder of third parties. Once the tribunal is in place, it can request consolidation from QICCA after consulting with the parties. However, the rules do not specify the exact conditions for consolidation after the tribunal has been constituted, unlike International Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of International Arbitration 

The 2024 Rules have also introduced a new mechanism to expedite relief in which the tribunal will be appointed within seven days of the respondent’s response to the claimant’s request for arbitration. Emergency Arbitration proceedings have also been incorporated in the Rules and disclosure of third-party funding has been prescribed. These revisions align QICCA with SIAC, ICC’s rules. These updates position QICCA as a more modern and globally aligned arbitral institution.

SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court raised concerns about the interpretation of limitation statutes in arbitration cases and observed that the rigid application of the law could curtail the limited remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge arbitral awards. 

A bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Pankaj Mithal dismissed an appeal filed by a company against a Delhi High Court judgment rejecting its challenge to an arbitral award as barred by limitation under Section 34. While the Court concluded that the appellant’s delay in filing the petition was not condonable under the prevailing legal framework, Justice Narasimha, in his opinion, with which Justice Mithal agreed, highlighted concerns with the strict interpretation of limitation provisions.

The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after the submission of the statement of defence.  A bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing a case in which the respondent had objected to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal after submitting its statement of defence. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the objection and subsequently passed an award. However, the District Judge set aside this award, and this decision was upheld by the Allahabad High Court. Taking reference to Section 16(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), the Appellant argued that the High Court erred in affirming the District Judge’s decision to set aside the arbitral award. The Appellant contended that by accepting the appointment of the sole arbitrator and being allowed to modify its statement of defence, the Respondent waived its right to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction after the statement of defence had been filed.

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court’s intervention under its Writ Jurisdiction in the Arbitral Proceedings, where it had directed the Arbitral Tribunal to grant additional time for one party to cross-examine another, despite the Tribunal already having provided ample time for cross-examination. Setting aside the High Court’s decision, the bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra observed that the High Court can interfere with the impugned order under its Writ Jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances when the impugned order suffers from perversity.

The Supreme Court affirmed the principle laid down in National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem & Another that the jurisdiction of the Courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) will not extend to modifying an arbitral award. 

The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra was hearing the case dealing with the land acquisition compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956. Dissatisfied with the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision to award land acquisition compensation @ ₹495/sq.m, the Appellant preferred application before the District Court under Section 34, which had modified the award and enhanced the compensation to be payable @ ₹4,500/sq.m with 9% interest.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that arbitral awards should only be interfered with in cases of perversity, violation of public policy, or patent illegality. It emphasized that appellate courts cannot reassess the merits of awards and must limit their inquiry to whether the award breaches Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act i.e., if the award is against the public policy of India. 

The bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing the case where the dispute arose concerning increased quantities of geogrid required for constructing a reinforced earth (RE) wall as part of a road construction project. NHAI claimed that increased quantities beyond those stated in the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) warranted renegotiation of rates.

HIGH COURT

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Dharmesh Sharma has held that the scope of interference by the Court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited, and the Court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to determine whether the award is good or bad.

In the present case, the court held that the expert tribunals award did not suffer from patent illegality, and thus could not be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that it cannot entertain a writ petition challenging an arbitral award, and the petitioner should challenge the award by taking recourse to appropriate remedies under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The court observed it is impermissible for the petitioner to agitate these issues in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned award having been rendered by the sole arbitrator, and the objections as regards (lack of) jurisdiction having been rejected by the sole arbitrator, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to assail the same by taking recourse to the remedies under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that orders passed by the Arbitrator during the pendency of Arbitral proceedings, which finally determines any substantive rights of the parties, constitutes an interim Arbitral Award, and can be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. At the outset, the court noted that the A&C Act does not define “interim award”. The court referred to IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products which held that the Arbitral Tribunal can make an interim arbitral Award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final Award; and the term “matter” in Section 31(6) of the A&C Act includes any point of dispute between the parties which has to be answered by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Supreme court had held that while the arbitration proceedings can be terminated only by way of a final Award, there can be one or more interim Awards before the final Award, which conclusively and finally determine some of the issues between the parties, finally leading upto the final Award.

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that an order which neither sets aside nor refuses to set aside the arbitral award, does not fall under the ambit of Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and is not appealable. The court observed that appeals in arbitration matters are maintainable only if expressly provided for in section 37/ 50 of the A&C Act. Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not confer an independent right to appeal.

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Subhendu Samanta held that when no application for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is made by either party, the civil court may very well entertain the suit and proceed with the adjudication of the same on merits in accordance with law.

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that once the “seat” of arbitration is designated in an agreement, it is to be treated as the exclusive jurisdiction for all arbitration proceedings. The Court referred to the ‘Shashoua Principle’, which propounds that when there is an express designation of a “venue” and no alternative seat is specified, the venue is considered the juridical seat of arbitration.

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya has held that power to correct computation error in the award under section 33 of the Arbitration Act can be exercised suo moto by the Arbitral Tribunal when no application is filed to this effect within 30 days. The court at the outset rejected the contention with respect to claims barred by limitation on the ground that the final bill was prepared on May 18, 2016 based on which the claim was made on November 11, 2016 which was within the limitation period. The court also noted that clause 3(a) of the contract allowed the forfeiture of security deposit only when the contract was rescinded but in the present case there was no material on record indicating that the contract was rescinded

EDITORIALS

  • Stay or Pay: Decoding the Deposit Dilemma in Staying Arbitral Awards 

(Stay or Pay: Decoding the Deposit Dilemma in Staying Arbitral Awards)

The article examines  the Bombay High Court in Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Shilpi Engineering Pvt. Ltd. judgment with regards to an application to stay the enforcement of a “Money Award”—an arbitral award for payment. The applicant, which had already provided a 100% bank guarantee during the set-aside process in the Calcutta High Court, argued that the conditions for staying enforcement should differ depending on whether the stay was sought during the set-aside phase or on appeal. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the stage of proceedings does not alter the finality of an arbitral award or its conversion into a court decree. The article analyses the critical points of the decision and the contrasting approaches between Indian and Singaporean arbitration enforcement.

  • SIAC Rules 2025: Breaking New Ground in Emergency Arbitration with Protective Preliminary Orders

(SIAC Rules 2025: Breaking New Ground in Emergency Arbitration with Protective Preliminary Orders )

An article regarding the introduction of the 7th Edition of the Arbitration Rules of the SIAC which permit parties to seek protective preliminary orders (“PPO”) from an emergency arbitrator without notification to other parties (i.e., ex parte preliminary orders, otherwise known as ex parte ad interim orders). The article delves into how the new PPO mechanism strikes a balance between rapid relief and due process. While it is not a cure-all solution, it enhances the procedural toolkit by allowing parties to secure urgent, albeit temporary, measures that prevent irreparable harm. The evolution of EA provisions, now including ex parte preliminary orders, reflects broader trends in international arbitration where speed and effectiveness are paramount, and enforcement issues are increasingly being addressed through legislative and judicial developments

FEBRUARY 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The Hague District Court Approves Public Sale of Shares for Nearly USD 2 Billion Award Enforcement

(Phillips Petroleum and ConocoPhillips v. PDVSA and others)

In the context of international arbitration award enforcement, can a domestic court authorize a public auction of attached assets when a previously approved private sale fails, in order to ensure effective execution of the arbitral award and maximize recovery for the award creditor?

Courts in jurisdictions that recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and domestic enforcement laws have the authority to determine the manner in which attached assets may be sold to satisfy such awards. This discretion is guided by the principles of:

  • Effective enforcement of final arbitral awards;
  • Maximizing execution value for the award creditor;
  • Equitable treatment of the award debtor;
  • And judicial discretion under national procedural codes (e.g., Dutch Civil Code Article 3:251(1))

In Phillips Petroleum and ConocoPhillips Petrozuata v. PDVSA, the award creditors sought to enforce a USD 2 billion ICC arbitral award recognized in the Netherlands. After PDVSA’s shares in a Dutch company, Propernyn B.V., were attached, the court initially authorized a private sale to recover the award amount. Despite an extended deadline, the private sale failed to yield results.

The award creditors petitioned for a public auction of the shares. PDVSA opposed the request, citing concerns over reduced market interest due to U.S. sanctions and the risk of undervaluation. The Hague District Court considered its duty to facilitate enforcement and found that the private sale process had been ineffective due to limited buyer information. The court further held that there was no compelling evidence that a public sale would deter buyers more than a private sale.

Exercising its discretion, the court allowed for a public auction, with conditions to balance interests:

  • A final extension for private sale until 1 March 2025;
  • A six-week notice period before any auction;
  • A restriction barring ConocoPhillips or its affiliates, if they were the highest bidder, from reselling the shares at a profit within three years.

The court concluded that a public auction was necessary and appropriate to fulfill the enforcement objectives of international arbitration. In doing so, it reaffirmed the court’s broad discretion in choosing execution methods that protect the integrity and efficacy of the arbitral process while maintaining fairness between the parties. Thus, the public sale was approved, subject to safeguards.

  • Singapore High Court Partially Annuls SIAC Award

Texan Minerals and Chemicals v. India Glycols and others

Can a domestic court set aside an arbitral award where the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction by determining liability against parties who were not properly within the scope of the arbitration agreement or the parties’ submissions, despite no breach of natural justice occurring in the arbitral process?

Under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted in many jurisdictions, including Singapore), an arbitral award may be set aside on limited grounds, including:

Firstly, Article 34(2)(a)(iii): Where the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration (i.e., excess of jurisdiction).

Secondly, Article 34(2)(a)(ii) and corresponding domestic provisions: Where a party was unable to present its case, violating natural justice.

Courts will generally not review the merits of an award but may intervene where the tribunal:

  • Decides on issues not submitted to it;
  • Rules against parties not bound by the arbitration agreement;
  • Decides beyond the scope of relief sought.

Courts are also reluctant to annul awards unless the breach is material and goes to the root of the award.

In its judgment, the Singapore High Court partially annulled an arbitral award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by finding two of the three respondents—ICI and Mr. Dharmesh Mehta—liable under the Manufacturer Representation 

Agreement (MRA). The Court observed that both the pleadings and the arbitral submissions clearly demonstrated that the dispute had been framed solely against India Glycols Limited (IGL), and no assertions had been made during the proceedings to suggest that ICI or Mr. Mehta had undertaken any obligations under the MRA. As such, the tribunal’s ruling that these two respondents had breached the agreement constituted a determination of matters not submitted to arbitration and thereby fell outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

In relation to the allegations of a breach of natural justice, the Court found no merit in the objections raised by the respondents. It held that the parties had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to present their case during the arbitration. The tribunal’s reliance on a “break-even presumption” was neither determinative nor material to the outcome, and therefore did not amount to a procedural impropriety requiring curial intervention. The Court clarified that the respondents’ grievances were essentially challenges to the substantive merits of the award, which do not warrant annulment under Singapore law.

Accordingly, the High Court upheld the tribunal’s findings and award against IGL, but annulled the portion of the award that imposed liability on ICI and Mr. Mehta, holding that such imposition constituted a jurisdictional overreach by the tribunal.

  • A U.S. Court May Enforce A Foreign Arbitral Award And Its Supporting Judgment As Long As The Foreign Tribunal Had Proper Jurisdiction And No Valid Defenses Under The Arbitration Law Are Established.

Cargill v. TBF Group and others

Issue that the Court was dealing with 

Whether a U.S. court can enforce a foreign arbitral award and the corresponding foreign judgment upholding that award, despite the defendant’s claims of lack of personal jurisdiction in the enforcing jurisdiction (U.S.) and allegations of procedural irregularities in the foreign arbitral proceedings.

The General Law of the Land

Personal Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Judgments: Personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor is not required in the enforcing jurisdiction (U.S.), as long as the foreign court issuing the judgment had personal jurisdiction over the debtor.

Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments: The recognition and enforcement of a foreign money judgment is governed by principles of comity, and U.S. courts typically enforce foreign judgments unless the judgment contradicts U.S. public policy or violates due process rights.

Arbitration Awards: Under the New York Convention, U.S. courts generally recognize and enforce international arbitration awards, provided they have been affirmed in the jurisdiction where the award was rendered.

The Courts Approach

Personal Jurisdiction: The court rejected Barschchovskiy’s argument that personal jurisdiction over him was required in the U.S. to recognize and enforce the foreign judgment. Instead, the court emphasized that the crucial factor is whether the English High Court had personal jurisdiction over Barschchovskiy when it issued its decision to enforce the LCIA award. The English High Court had jurisdiction, so the U.S. court did not need to establish personal jurisdiction over him.

No Valid Challenge: Barschchovskiy’s allegations of fraud and lack of integrity in the English High Court’s judgment were deemed vague, unsupported by evidence, and legally irrelevant. The court found that these claims did not constitute valid grounds for challenging the foreign judgment.

Due Process Argument: Barschchovskiy’s argument that enforcing the foreign judgment would violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause was rejected. The court affirmed that recognizing a foreign judgment does not require personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in the U.S., as long as the foreign court had jurisdiction.

Issue before the Court

Whether a vacatur of an arbitral award rendered under the rules of an international institution can be allowed on grounds of procedural unfairness, excess of arbitral authority, or manifest disregard of the law under the narrowly defined exceptions recognized in arbitration law.

The General Law

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and widely accepted principles of international arbitration, judicial review of arbitral awards is highly limited. A court may vacate an award only in exceptional circumstances, such as where (i) the proceedings were fundamentally unfair, (ii) the arbitrators exceeded their authority by disregarding the parties’ agreement, or (iii) the award reflects a manifest disregard of the law. Courts are generally deferential to arbitral tribunals’ procedural and substantive determinations, and mere legal or factual error is insufficient for vacatur.

The United States District Court conducted a thorough evaluation of the procedural conduct of the arbitral tribunal, which included assessing the tribunal’s evidentiary rulings, case management decisions, and legal reasoning. The Court concluded that the tribunal acted within the procedural discretion afforded by both the arbitration agreement and the applicable institutional rules. Furthermore, the tribunal’s application of governing law, as well as its interpretations regarding liability limits and damage calculation methodologies, were found to be well-reasoned and within its designated authority. The Court also noted that the petitioners did not fulfill the demanding burden of proof necessary to establish manifest disregard of the law or any misconduct that would warrant the vacatur of the award.

Issue before the Court

Whether a foreign arbitral award rendered under the ICC Rules may be enforced in the Netherlands, notwithstanding its annulment at the seat of arbitration (India), where the annulment was based on domestic liquidation proceedings that allegedly violated due process and fundamental principles of international public policy.

Rule pursuant to the Issue

Pursuant to Article V(1)(e) of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the award has been set aside by a competent authority in the country where it was made. However, this provision is permissive, not mandatory. Moreover, Article V(2)(b) provides that recognition or enforcement of an award may also be refused if it would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing State.

In Dutch jurisprudence, enforcement courts are not bound to automatically defer to annulments rendered by foreign courts, particularly where such decisions are the product of proceedings that violate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), specifically Article 6, which guarantees the right to a fair trial.

Applicability of the Rule

Devas Multimedia America Inc. (“DMAI”), a subsidiary of the award creditor, sought enforcement of an ICC arbitral award rendered in its favour and against Antrix Corporation Ltd., a State-owned Indian company. The Hague District Court initially denied enforcement on the basis that DMAI lacked authority, citing the Indian court orders winding up Devas Multimedia Private Limited and annulling the award based on alleged fraud and public policy violations.

However, upon appeal, the Hague Court of Appeal undertook an independent review of the Indian proceedings underpinning the award’s annulment. The appellate court found that the Indian National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had denied Devas fundamental procedural protections, including:

Firstly, the refusal to allow the production of documents critical to refuting fraud allegations;

Secondly, the reliance on employee statements without providing Devas the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses;

Thirdly, the Supreme Court’s treatment of key allegations as undisputed despite contrary submissions by Devas.

These procedural deficiencies were found to be incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR and with Dutch standards of due process. Consequently, the Dutch court declined to recognize the Indian liquidation and annulment judgments.

The Court further emphasized that annulment of an award at the seat does not automatically preclude enforcement in another jurisdiction. Here, since the annulment proceedings themselves were fundamentally flawed, their recognition would offend the public policy of the Netherlands, particularly in light of constitutional guarantees and international obligations.

The Hague Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s ruling and granted leave to enforce the ICC arbitral award in favour of DMAI. The judgment affirms the principle that due process in annulment proceedings is a condition precedent to their recognition under the New York Convention. Accordingly, a foreign set-aside judgment, if rendered in violation of internationally recognized procedural norms, may be disregarded by enforcement courts in favour of upholding arbitral finality and integrity.

Issue before the Court

Whether an arbitral award rendered by a SIAC tribunal can be annulled under Singapore’s International Arbitration Act on grounds of alleged forgery in the underlying guarantee and public policy, where the party raising the challenge failed to timely object during arbitration and did not establish conclusive proof of forgery.

Rule Pursuant to the Issue

Under Section 24(b) of the Singapore International Arbitration Act (IAA), a party may seek to set aside an arbitral award where the award was induced or affected by fraud or a breach of natural justice. However, challenges based on jurisdictional objections must be raised during the arbitral proceedings, failing which the party is deemed to have waived its right under Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is incorporated into Singapore arbitration law.

Courts in Singapore maintain a pro-enforcement stance, and the threshold to annul an award on public policy grounds is exceptionally high. Allegations of forgery or procedural unfairness must be substantiated with clear and convincing evidence.

Applicability of the Rule

Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. (SEC) initiated arbitration against Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (RINFRA) pursuant to a Guarantee Letter allegedly executed by RINFRA to secure obligations under a supply agreement between SEC and Reliance UK. Following a final award by the SIAC tribunal, RINFRA sought to annul the award before the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), contending that the Guarantee Letter was forged and that enforcement would violate public policy.

The SICC rejected the annulment request, based on the below-mentioned contentions:

  1. Waiver of jurisdictional objection: RINFRA participated in the arbitral proceedings without raising any objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, it had waived its right to contest jurisdiction post-award.
  2. Insufficient evidence of forgery: The court found RINFRA’s forgery claim unpersuasive. The fresh evidence, including witness testimony from a former officer, failed to demonstrate the alleged fabrication of the Guarantee Letter.
  3. Public policy: The court held that RINFRA failed to meet the high burden of proof necessary to invoke public policy as a ground for annulment under Singapore law.

On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal upheld the SICC’s findings. It reaffirmed that a party’s failure to object to jurisdiction during arbitration precludes later challenge. The court found that the forgery allegations were speculative and unsubstantiated, and that the evidence lacked probative weight to justify intervention. Furthermore, it emphasized that public policy grounds must reflect a clear and fundamental breach of Singaporean justice, which was not present in this case.

Issue before the Court

Whether the Court of Appeal has the authority to vary or revoke a final anti-suit injunction, previously granted to enforce arbitration agreements, when subsequent foreign court orders impose coercive penalties that may expose the applicant to severe commercial risks.

Rule Pursuant to the Issue

Under CPR Part 3.1(7), the English courts possess the discretionary power to vary or revoke any order, including final ones, in light of changed circumstances. While finality of judgments is a fundamental principle, it is not absolute. The court must weigh whether reopening or modifying a final order is necessary to prevent injustice and whether exceptional circumstances justify deviation from the norm. In particular, anti-suit injunctions, though coercive by nature, are subject to evolving facts, especially in international jurisdictional conflicts. When foreign proceedings and penalties render compliance with a domestic injunction commercially punitive or impossible, the court may intervene to modify its prior order.

Applicability of the Rule

UniCredit, a German bank, initially obtained a final anti-suit injunction against RusChemAlliance (RCA), a Russian entity, to enforce arbitration clauses in English-law governed bonds. However, following the injunction’s affirmation by the UK Supreme Court, RCA secured a ruling from the Arbitrazh Court of Saint Petersburg mandating UniCredit to seek cancellation of the English order or face penalties exceeding €250 million.

UniCredit argued that continued enforcement of the injunction would expose it to draconian consequences in Russia, where RCA’s assets and judicial control prevail. The Court acknowledged that UniCredit, though commercially pressured, had acted voluntarily and was entitled to reassess the need for injunctive relief. Importantly, the Court noted that UniCredit’s exposure stemmed from coercive foreign legislation, not from bad faith or manipulation of the court.

The Court further considered whether discharging the injunction would undermine English public policy or international arbitration obligations under the New York Convention. While RCA’s disregard of the arbitration agreement and contempt of the English court were noted, they were not deemed sufficient to outweigh the pressing commercial threat faced by UniCredit. Nor did the Court consider that compliance with the Russian court’s order amounted to waiver of arbitration rights sufficient to defeat policy concerns under Article II(3) of the Convention.

The Court also confirmed it had jurisdiction under CPR Part 3.1(7) to vary final anti-suit injunctions, particularly in private commercial disputes where jurisdictional dynamics evolve post-judgment. It concluded that anti-suit injunctions are uniquely susceptible to reconsideration in light of reciprocal international proceedings and pressures

HIGH COURT 

  • Court cannot appoint a different arbitrator apart from the one mentioned under the sub-lease agreements without strong reason 

(M/s. Kranthi Grand DKNV Hospitalities and Another v. M/s. Manasa Estates and Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and 2 Others 2025 SCC OnLine AP 671)

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in M/s. Kranthi Grand DKNV Hospitalities v. M/s. Manasa Estates addressed the appointment of an arbitrator arising from a Sub-Lease Agreement for hotel operations. A dispute over property possession led the Applicant to invoke the agreement’s arbitration clause, which named Sri Venu Gottipati as the arbitrator. However, the Applicant sought the appointment of a different, independent arbitrator, citing a lack of trust in the named individual, a proposal rejected by the Respondents.The central issue before the Court was whether to appoint an arbitrator other than the one contractually agreed upon. The Applicant relied on Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, arguing for an independent appointment.
The High Court dismissed the application, strongly affirming the principle of party autonomy in arbitration. It held that parties are bound by their agreement, including the choice of arbitrator specified in Clause 15 of the Sub-Lease Agreement. The Court deemed the Applicant’s reasons for objecting to Sri Venu Gottipati as unsubstantiated and insufficient to deviate from the agreed procedure. Consequently, the Court directed the parties to refer their disputes to the contractually named arbitrator, Sri Venu Gottipati, reinforcing the sanctity of freely entered agreements in dispute resolution.

  • Whether the Court can appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when one of the parties is a non-signatory to the agreements 

(Dixon Tech (India) Ltd. v. M/s Jaiico & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 893)

The Delhi High Court, in a petition by Dixon Technologies under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, addressed the appointment of an arbitrator for disputes with M/s Jaiico arising from two agreements. A key procedural point was the involvement of Respondent No. 2, who was not a signatory to either agreement containing arbitration clauses (Clause 12 of the Transportation Agreement dated 01.03.2021 and Clause 23 of the Customs Clearing Agreement dated 01.04.2022).Dixon Technologies sought to exclude Respondent No. 2 from the current petition but wished to retain the option to argue before the arbitrator that Respondent No. 2 is a necessary party, potentially under Order I Rule 10 CPC.The primary issue was the arbitrator’s appointment for the Dixon Technologies-Jaiico dispute. The Court allowed Dixon Technologies to remove Respondent No. 2 from the Section 11 petition. Crucially, it granted Dixon Technologies the liberty to apply to the appointed arbitrator to argue for Respondent No. 2’s joinder as a necessary party under Order I Rule 10 CPC. The Court then appointed Justice Arvind Sangwan as the sole arbitrator, with proceedings to be conducted under DIAC rules. This decision streamlines the initial arbitration between the signatories while deferring the question of the non-signatory’s inclusion to the appointed tribunal. The Court’s consideration is likely touched upon principles of party autonomy and the scope of the arbitration agreement.

  • Whether an award can be challenged under S. 12(5) on the grounds that the arbitrator’s appointment was unilateral and illegal after participating in the proceedings 

(Bhadra International India Pvt. Ltd & Ors. V. Airports Authority of India 2025 SCC OnLine 698)

The Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal by Bhadra International & Ors. challenging an arbitral award against the Airports Authority of India (AAI). The dispute arose from a contract with an arbitration clause, where AAI unilaterally appointed the sole arbitrator. Both parties participated fully in the arbitration proceedings without any objection to this appointment. Later, the Appellants challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, arguing the unilateral appointment violated Section 12(5) of the Act.The central issue was whether the Appellants could challenge the award based on the unilateral appointment, having participated without objection.The High Court rejected the appeal, holding that the Appellants’ challenge was without merit. The Court emphasized that their active and unqualified participation in the arbitration, without raising any concerns about the arbitrator’s appointment, constituted a clear waiver of their right to object. The Court reasoned that having engaged in the process without protest, the Appellants could not subsequently challenge the outcome based on a procedural irregularity they had implicitly accepted. This ruling reinforces the principle that parties must raise objections to the composition of the arbitral tribunal promptly and cannot do so after participating fully and then facing an unfavorable award.

  • Award can be partially set-aside so far as the findings are independent and severable from the rest of the award 

(Zaffar Abbas Din v. Nasir Hamid Khan 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 125)

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, in Zaffar Abbas Din v. Nasir Hamid Khan, addressed a Section 34 petition under the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, challenging an arbitral award. The petitioner sought to overturn the award issued by a tribunal led by a former Meghalaya Chief Justice. The key question was whether the award, dated January 21, 2023, should be set aside, requiring scrutiny under Section 34 of the Act.The High Court partially allowed the petition. It overturned paragraph 19(a) of the award, which mandated the deemed renewal of an agreement for five years. The court found this specific relief to be in violation of Section 14(2) of the Specific Relief Act, citing the agreement’s determinable nature. However, the court upheld the remaining reliefs granted in paragraphs 19(b) through 19(g) of the award. The decision reflects the Court’s willingness to scrutinize arbitral awards for legal compliance, while also respecting the tribunal’s findings where they align with statutory requirements. It demonstrates a measured approach to upholding portions of awards, while correcting legal errors.

The Bombay High Court dismissed a petition by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission (MPSC) challenging an arbitral award in a dispute with Vast India Pvt. Ltd. The dispute stemmed from a commercial services contract initiated by MPSC’s bidding process, leading to arbitration. MPSC sought to overturn the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, alleging patent illegality.The central issue was whether the arbitral award met the threshold for being set aside due to patent illegality under Section 34 of the Act, requiring the Court to assess the limits of judicial interference in arbitration outcomes.The Bombay High Court upheld the arbitral award, rejecting MPSC’s petition. The Court found no valid grounds under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to warrant setting aside the arbitrator’s decision. Consequently, the award was affirmed, and the related interim application was also disposed of. This ruling reinforces the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral awards, highlighting that courts will generally not interfere with the substance of an award unless it demonstrably falls within the narrowly defined grounds for challenge under the Arbitration Act.

The Delhi High Court reversed an arbitral award that had ruled in favor of Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) in a dispute with the Union of India (UOI) concerning gas migration in the Krishna-Godavari Basin. The core issue was RIL’s entitlement under their Production Sharing Contract (PSC) to produce and sell gas that had migrated from an adjacent block belonging to ONGC, which claimed unjust enrichment.The UOI challenged the arbitral tribunal’s decision, leading the High Court to examine the PSC, the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP), and the public trust doctrine.The Delhi High Court set aside the arbitral award, ruling in favor of the UOI. The court found the award to be patently illegal, contravening substantive law and violating the terms of the PSC, NELP, and the public trust doctrine. It concluded that RIL was unjustly enriched by exploiting the migrated gas. This judgment highlights the judiciary’s role in ensuring arbitral awards comply with fundamental legal principles and contractual terms, especially concerning publicly held natural resources, effectively overturning the arbitrator’s decision. 

EDITORIALS

  • Arbitration Agreements Must reflect the Parties’ Common Will and Are Interpreted Autonomously Under French Law

 ( Sultan de Sulu case ) 

While interpreting international arbitration agreements, the French Arbitration law relies largely on the common will of the parties and is formulated pursuant to the principles of good faith and utility, without reference to the law of any state (Dalico case). This principle was reaffirmed in the Sultan de Sulu case, where the Paris Court of Appeal and subsequnetly the Court of Cassation held that an arbitration clause designating the British Consul General in Brunei as arbitrator became null and void due to the disappearance of that function, as it was an essential element of the parties’ consent to arbitrate. While the French Law, through Article 1520(1) CPC, does not explicitly list the nullity of the arbitration agreement as a ground to refuse enforcement, it is implicitly covered by the rule allowing refusal where the tribunal wrongly declared itself competent. The decision marks a rare instance where a foreign arbitral award was denied enforcement on the basis that the arbitration agreement had become invalid post-conclusion, illustrating the French courts’ wide discretion in interpreting arbitration clauses and their willingness to uphold party autonomy, even to the point of finding that no valid agreement to arbitrate exists.

  • Royal Assent to the Arbitration Act 2025: Incremental Reforms Strengthening Arbitration Law 

(Arbitration Act 2025)  

The long-awaited reforms to the Arbitration Act 1996 have been formally enacted with the Arbitration Act 2025 receiving Royal assent in February 2025. The enactment was met with approval after dual rounds of public consultation, publication of the final recommendation alongside a proposed Arbitration Bill in 2023, and a final reading in Parliament on February 11, 2025. The 2025 Act is more an exercise in incremental improvement than a shift in approach, and accordingly, it has ushered in a series of legal modifications to the existing provisions. It affirms the autonomy of arbitration by defaulting the governing law of arbitration to the law of the seat, unless expressly agreed otherwise, thereby moving away from the Enka v Chubb presumption. It empowers the tribunals to summarily dismiss unmeritorious claims or defences, subject to party autonomy. The act also narrows court review of jurisdictional challenges where the tribunal has ruled and the party participated, reinforcing finality and tribunal authority.

  • Abuse of Process as a Limit on Investor Rights: Good Faith and Treaty Purpose as Admissibility Standards

 (WM Mining v Mongolia )

While examining the question of the extent to which the abuse of process doctrine applies to a claimant seeking to obtain an illegitimate advantage by commencing investment arbitration, the investment tribunal in WM Mining v Mongolia ruled the party claims inadmissible and constituted an abuse of power. The tribunal reiterated that the doctrine of abuse of process operates as a limit on investor conduct where the right to arbitrate is exercised in bad faith or for purposes inconsistent with the object and purpose of investment treaties. Crucially, the tribunal broadened the scope of abuse beyond the commonly cited context of corporate restructuring to include strategies like unjustified delay, forum shopping, and the manipulation of procedural rights for illegitimate gain. Ultimately, the WM Mining tribunal’s approach underlines that international arbitration cannot be used as a vehicle for scheming legal obligations, reaffirming the primacy of good faith and treaty purpose in the admissibility of claims.

  • Attorney General of India, Mr. R. Venkataramani, advocates for a robust Indo-Saudi Arbitration Protocol during his address at the Riyadh International Disputes Week 2025. (RDW25) 

The Riyadh International Disputes Week 2025 featured a special address by the Attorney General of India, Mr. R. Venkataramani, highlighting the need for a mutually beneficial Indo-Saudi arbitration framework. He underlined a greater collaboration of both countries by capitalising on their strong economic ties and legal advancements through a two-pronged strategy, ie. Mutual Agreement on Legal Convergence and an Inter-Country Enforcement Protocol. Mr. Venkataramani also urged the formation of a joint India–Saudi Arabia working group of legal experts and policymakers to develop an arbitration framework, inviting Saudi representatives to New Delhi for further discussions. His speech signals India’s readiness to strengthen legal and economic collaboration with Saudi Arabia. 

  • Successful Conclusion of the 4th AALCO Annual Arbitration Forum 2025

(Fourth AALCO Annual Arbitration Forum)  

The 4th Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO) Annual Arbitration Forum (AAF), jointly hosted by AALCO, the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Department (Legal Affairs Division), and the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC), was successfully conducted on 20-21 February 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The event brought together a vast array of distinguished experts who deliberated on the matters of transforming ISDS of investment treaties and ISDS mechanisms across Asia and Africa, Technology and ADR, and Enforcement of Arbitral awards across borders. Inaugurated by prominent dignitaries, the Forum featured six thematic sessions and concluded with a reaffirmed commitment to strengthening dispute resolution frameworks across Asia and Africa.

MARCH

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Enforcing investment treaty awards against sovereign states, with reservation to the New York Convention.

(Republic of India v. CCDM Holdings, LLC & Ors. [2025] FCAFC 2).

There has been a significant increase in the number of investor state disputes over the last decade. The recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Republic of India v. CCDM can provide guidance for future questions of enforceability of arbitral awards arising out of investor-state disputes.

Background of the dispute-

Three Mauritius – incorporated companies which were substituted in with US- based entities (CCDM Holdings LLC, Devas Employees Fund US LLC, and Telcom Devas LLC)(respondents in the present appeal) in May 2023, originally brought arbitral proceedings against India. They alleged that India expropriated their investments in Devas Multimedia Pte Ltd (an Indian Company) and indirectly rights under the contract between Devas India and Antrix Corporation (an Indian state- owned entity) for the lease of satellite spectrum. The alleged contract between Devas/ Antrix was annulled in February 2011 by India’s Cabinet Committee citing national and strategic needs.

The claimants commenced arbitration in July 2012. Soon in July 2016 the arbitral tribunal, administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, issued an award on jurisdiction and merits. Following this the investors filed an originating application before the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) for the recognition and enforcement of a US$111 million arbitral award.

An interlocutory application by India was rejected by the single judge of FCA to set aside the originating application on the basis of sovereign immunity.  India appealed the same to the Full Court after obtaining leave from FCA.

Principle Issue in Appeal –

Whether India, by ratifying the New York Convention, has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of Australian Courts under Section 10 (2) of the Immunities Act in cases seeking to enforce an arbitral award against it as an award party.

Full Court’s decision-

The court concluded that the primary judge was wrong to observe that Australia must enforce awards against India under the New York Convention, despite India’s reservations. India’s reservation under Art I (3) of the New York Convention applies to awards arising out of non-commercial disputes. The respondents’ acceptance to the non- commercial nature of the BIT and the Annulment characterised the award arising from a non- commercial relationship. Hence, with reference to the Vienna Convention and International Law, the court explained that India and Australia are obliged to each other to enforce awards that fall within the scope of India’s reservation i.e. commercial disputes only. Another significant observation by the court was that India’s obligations under the New York Convention are expressly limited by its reservation and it did not intend to waive immunity for awards outside the reservation.

Conclusively, India was able to set aside the originating application by reason of being immune from the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia provided by Section 38 of the Immunities Act, 1985.

  • Should the court allow arbitration to proceed during ongoing insolvency proceedings? 

 Sapura Fabrication Sdn Bhd & Ors v GAS [2025] SGCA 13

The Singapore Court decided to issue its judgment in Sapura Fabrication v. GAS despite withdrawal of appeal by the appellants. The step highlights court’s pro-arbitration nature to further Singapore’s jurisprudence in the area of insolvency- related disputes.

Background of the Dispute-

The Sapura Entities, (appellants) are Malaysian private companies and subsidiaries of Sapura Energy Berhad. They have been undergoing a series of restructuring proceedings in Malaysia since 2022. A part of restructuring process required the Sapra entities to obtain moratoriums and convene creditor meetings. Creditors, including GAP (respondent), filed proofs of debt claims arising from contracts for construction services worth US$169 million (approx.). Under the Malaysian law, moratoriums last up to 12 months but can be extended as done by the appellants in the following years. The Singapore High Court granted similar moratoriums recognizing the Malaysian restructuring proceedings. These were covered under the Singapore Model Law as foreign main proceedings.

The respondent issued a serving notice for partial termination. Soon after, it initiated arbitration proceedings against Sapura and its subsidiaries in Singapore alleging breaches and insolvency events based on the contracts. This was opposed by the appellants and challenged the respondent’s rights to terminate the contract scope.

The Singapore High Court granted a carve out in favor of arbitration allowing the respondent’s arbitration to proceed, based on Wang Aifeng Test and Mandatory Ground.

Sapura entities appealed, but the parties settled before the judgment following the withdrawal of appeal. Nevertheless, the Singapore Court of Appeal went forward and delivered its judgement.

The Judgment-

The appellants claimed that the High Court wrongly applied the Wang Aifeng test and the it should have applied “exceptional circumstances” standard rather. The standard provides for granting permission for arbitration proceedings only in exceptional circumstances. The Singapore Court of Appeal reaffirmed and applied the Wang Aifeng test as the guiding principles for the court to determine whether a carve- out from insolvency moratoriums should be granted to allow arbitration proceedings. The Wang Aifeng factors were discussed using the discretionary ground by the court wherein it explained its application based on the nature of the claim, existing remedies, timing and prejudice to the parties. Firstly, the court established that arbitration forums are more suitable for resolving validity of termination, alleged breaches and quantification of damages owing to the complex nature of these issues in the present matter. The Court found that allowing arbitration would not only allow restructuring but also not prejudice the interests of other creditors, since respondent’s claims amounted to 6-7% of Sapura’s total debt.  

Sapura’s reliance on the Malaysian court’s decision in Tecnimonthq (Sapura Energy Bhd & Ors v Tecnimonthqc Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 124) to support its claim for applying exceptional circumstances standard was rejected by the court. The court discussed that the principle of comity doesn’t go as far as to require Singapore court to decide the present case on a similar basis as the Malaysian court.  The court further supported its by citing no such requirement under UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation.

More significantly the Court of appeal clarified the tension between intersection of arbitration and insolvency laws by stating that insolvency policy takes precedence over arbitration enforcement after clarifying the position of the court in AnAn (AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2020] 1 SLR 1158 (“AnAn”). The High Court had relied on the AnAn judgment to cast a mandatory obligation to enforce arbitration agreements. The court of appeal disagreed with this approach. The Court of Appeal observed that Arbitration agreements must not always override moratoriums undermining the purpose of restructuring moratorium to give debtor time and space for restructuring.

Conclusively, the Singapore Court of Appeal concluded that the High court did not err in applying the Wang Aifeng factors to grant a carve out from insolvency moratoriums in the present case owing to the facts of the matter but it is not a mandatory obligation. There may arise the need to protect the restructuring process outweighing enforcement of arbitration agreements. 

The conference addressed legal, social, environmental, and commercial challenges in mining disputes due to essential minerals like lithium, copper, rare earths and nickel. These are critical minerals for telecommunication, energy storage and electric vehicles.

Amid the geopolitical instability and increasing scrutiny, Arbitration is soon to play a critical role in protecting investments. A significant example highlighting the geopolitical tensions is Panama’s recent cancellation of Chinese contracts. It is argued that this impacts investments and leads to disputes. The Panel highlighted that most of the Chinese investors in Latin America are State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Arbitration Tribunals prefer to use the “Broches Test” to determine if SOEs can bring claims. Such claims are generally allowed except in cases wherein the SOEs act as direct government agents or perform any government related functions.

While some countries prefer to choose their side, Africa has come up with resource- nationalist policies. The panel claimed Africa’s stance as more protectionist by raising royalties or changing mining laws. Such policies also increase the probability of disputes with foreign investors. The conference underscored the importance of stabilizing investments as countries move towards protectionist measures. The panel “The New Protectionism: Selected Investor-State Issues Arising from Critical Minerals Strategies” discussed arbitration as an essential tool to manage risks arising out of global rivalries, tariffs, growing regulatory complexities and the risk environment for mining. Another panel discussed  the role of experts in assessing ESG compliance (environmental impact), feasibility studies and project valuation at length. 

Mining sits at the intersection of global economics, technological advancements and environmentals shifts. It crosses multiple jurisdictions hence it will require arbitration to delve into complexity and application of local, international and soft- law (non-binding guidelines). The conference concluded on the note that arbitration will remain pivotal in the mining sector and stakeholders should take steps to meet the sector’s evolving needs. 

SUPREME COURT

  • The contract must be interpreted as a whole to determine the lex arbitri (seat). 

(Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 570)

The Supreme Court in Disortho v. Meril Life affirmed the three -fold test laid down in Sulamerica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and Others v. Enesa Engenharia S.A and Others. The two parties, Disortho S.A.S (petitioner), a foreign entity incorporated in Colombia and Meril Life Science Private Limited (Respondent), an Indian entity entered into a Distributor Agreement wherein Petitioner was appointed as the exclusive distributor for Respondent’s medical products to be distributed in Columbia. Disortho filed a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, for appointment of an arbitral panel in terms of Clauses 16.5 and 18 of the Distributor Agreement after the execution of the Agreement. This was contested by the respondent placing reliance on Clause 18 of the Agreement. The Supreme Court analyzed both the clauses and stated that a contract must be interpreted as a whole. The court adopted the approach from Arnold v. Britton to interpret the language of the contract. Applying this, the court held that the parties were aware of Clause 18 as the venue and yet added clause 16.5. Clause 16.5 unambiguously establishes Gujrat court’s jurisdiction and supervisory authority (lex arbitri). Conclusively, the Supreme Court appointed an arbitrator and held that Indian courts have the authority to appoint arbitrators under Section 11(6).  

HIGH COURTS 

  • Hon’ble Delhi High Court reaffirmed the principle that accepting goods under an invoice constitutes acceptance of its governing terms and conditions, including an arbitration clause.

(Radico Khaitan Limited v. Harish Chouhan 2025:DHC:1767)

The Court in the present case observed that the conduct of the parties is a determinative factor in assessing the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. The central legal question before the Court was; whether an arbitration clause contained in an invoice, unilaterally issued by one of the parties, constitutes a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties? The bench underscored the pro-arbitration stance adopted in Indian jurisprudence, wherein courts are mandated to refer disputes to arbitration even if there is a slight doubt regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. The Court while referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd. [ (2024) 4 SCC 1 also reiterated that when dealing with a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the court’s jurisdiction is limited to making prima facie opinion as to the existence of an arbitration agreement. It is within the power of the Arbitration Tribunal to conduct a detailed examination and validate the existence of the agreement. If such an agreement is found to exist, even on a preliminary stage, the dispute must be referred to arbitration, leaving all further determinations to the arbitral tribunal. The subject decision serves as a reaffirmation of the Indian judiciary’s pro-arbitration approach and its commitment to minimizing judicial interference in arbitration proceedings

  • Signatures of all tribunal members in an Arbitral Award is a substantive requirement rather than a mere ministerial act.

(M/s Isc Projects v. Steel Authority of India 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1133)

The High Court of Delhi set aside an award, on the grounds that it was not signed by all the arbitrators, emphasized that an arbitral award must bear the signatures of all tribunal members, ensuring each member’s participation in the decision-making process. If any member’s signature is missing, the award must explicitly state the reason for such omission. Failure to provide these reasons can render the award vulnerable to being set aside. In the case at hand, the tribunal’s award lacked the signature of one arbitrator, and no explanation was provided for this omission. 

  • Acting on invoices without objection implies acceptance of the embedded Arbitration Clause

Sanjiv Mohan Gupta v. Sai Estate Consultants Chembur [2025 SCC OnLine Bom 567]

The Bombay High Court while considering an application under Section 11 reaffirmed that an arbitration clause embedded within invoices can be deemed accepted if both parties have acted upon those invoices without objection. The Hon’ble Court stated that since the invoices formed a critical part of the contractual framework the issuance of cheques against these invoices can be deemed prima facie evidence of the Respondent’s acceptance of the terms, including the arbitration clause

EDITORIAL

Indian parties have consistently been amongst the top ten users of the SIAC Rules since 2010 and an internal empirical study conducted by SIAC revealed that the Institution administered over 1,300 arbitrations involving over 2,000 Indian parties from 2011 to 2022 (and no SIAC award was set aside in India during this period). Any changes to the SIAC Rules are of great interest to Indian users. The EA procedure has been revised to allow for the application to be made prior to the filing of the notice of arbitration. Indian parties now have an alternative to Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996  for urgent interim relief in support of an arbitration  Proceedings for ex-parte interim relief and foreign parties may likewise consider seeking such relief against Indian counterparties from an emergency arbitrator appointed by an institution they are familiar with. With a focus on low-value disputes, SIAC has introduced the Streamlined Procedure that may be adopted prior to the constitution of the tribunal by an agreement of the parties, or by default where the amount in dispute does not exceed SGD 1 million introduction of the Streamlined Procedure by SIAC quite lucrative to Indian users and gives them an additional option to resolve their low value commercial disputes.

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