By: Ayansh Gangwar, Bhumika Singh, Daksh Arora, Harshit Bagree, Pragnya Hungenahally, Priyal Bansal, Ujwal Gupta, Usri Palchaudhuri.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
On 17 April 2025, the Commercial Court in London held that India’s ratification of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is not a waiver of state immunity to the enforcement of two arbitral awards.
The case arose from investors trying to enforce a USD 194 million award under the India–Mauritius Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) against India in the London Commercial Court, following India’s termination of a contract relating to the S‑band satellite spectrum with Devas Multimedia.
The Court held that ratification alone does not waive state unity by India, as per the test for waiver in English Law. The court also relied on the travaux préparatoiresin respect of the New York Convention as well as concluded that Article III of the New York Convention requiring recognition and enforcement “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon” preserves state immunity as it respects the local court’s procedural system.
A US court has refused to dismiss a Hungarian investor’s action to enforce a US$261 million Energy Charter Treaty award against Croatia – finding the state’s sovereign immunity defence was “foreclosed” as a result of an appellate ruling on other intra-EU ECT awards.
MOL had received approximately $235 million as compensation for Croatia’s breaches of its obligations under the ECT. MOL was granted this Award against Croatia after nine years of effort to obtain redress for harm that Croatia inflicted on MOL’s investments starting in 2009. They then moved to enforce the award in a US court.
Croatia invoked sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to try to dismiss the enforcement action, arguing that intra-EU ECT awards cannot be enforced due to EU legal rules. The U.S. court rejected Croatia’s sovereign immunity defence, relying on binding precedent from appellate decisions affirming that intra‑EU ECT-based ICSID awards are enforceable under FSIA’s arbitration exception and thus found that Croatia’s immunity defence was effectively foreclosed given that previous appellate rulings held FSIA’s arbitration exceptions cover intra-EU ECT awards.
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators has recently released its “2025 Guideline on the Use of AI in Arbitration”. The Guidelines firstly set out the Advantages and Risks of AI in arbitration, listing out improving efficiencies and cost-effectiveness in transcription, translation and the taking of evidence, while confidentiality issues and enforceability of such awards were listed as potential risks.
The second part of the Guidelines sets out that use of AI tools would not undermine the parties’ and arbitrators’ accountability and responsibility and thus, they shall make reasonable enquiries as to the same.
The third part lays out the procedural aspect involved, with the Arbitrator having to check for any such clauses involving the application of AI as well as may give directions or make procedural rulings, subject to the parties’ autonomy, while the fourth part lays out specifically the use of AI by arbitrators’.
These guidelines aim to provide practical and ethical guidance on integrating AI into arbitration. They recognize both the efficiency and performance gains AI can offer and the risks it introduces confidentiality breaches, bias, award enforceability, and environmental impacts.
China’s Lenovo and Sweden’s Ericsson have agreed to drop litigation over licensing of cellular patents in various countries and resolve their remaining disputes through arbitration. This includes cases before the US International Trade Commission and courts in the US, UK, Brazil, and Colombia
The Settlement partially resolves patent licensing dispute between the parties, with financial impacts expected to be recognized from Q2 2025. The parties further agreed on arbitration to fully and finally resolve the remaining patent licensing disputes and end all ongoing patent-related legal proceedings between the parties.
The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA) announced the appointment of Samantha Kelsey as Deputy Secretary-General. As Deputy Secretary-General, Samantha will be supporting the Secretary-General, Diana Bowman and takes over the position previously held by Kiran Sanghera.
Prior to joining ACICA, Samantha held senior roles at Hall & Wilcox, a prominent Australian law firm, and Baker Botts in London and Dubai, where she specialised in commercial dispute resolution, with a particular focus on international arbitration. She has represented clients across a range of sectors, including construction, energy, and finance, and has a deep understanding of the needs of multinational businesses seeking effective, impartial, and efficient dispute resolution.
In JSC DTEK Krymenergo v. The Russian Federation [2025] EWHC 1060 (Comm), the English Commercial Court considered whether to stay enforcement of a USD 208 million UNCITRAL arbitral award in favour of a Ukrainian energy company (“JSC”) against the Russian Federation (“Russia”), during the pendency of Russia’s annulment challenge before the Hague Court of Appeal. The dispute arose from JSC’s claim that Russia had expropriated its electricity assets in Crimea in breach of the Ukraine-Russia BIT, with the tribunal awarding substantial damages to JSC. Russia sought to set aside the award in Dutch courts on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and simultaneously resisted enforcement in England by invoking state immunity and requesting a stay until the Dutch proceedings concluded. JSC argued that Russia had no intention to pay, that Dutch proceedings could last well over five years, and that delay would cause prejudice. Keeping this in mind, Russia contended that the risk of inconsistent judgments justified a stay. The English Court applied Section 103(5) of the Arbitration Act 1996 and held that a temporary stay was warranted, given that three of Russia’s four annulment grounds had a prospect of being accepted and the risk of inconsistent outcomes evidently outweighed the prejudice that may be caused to JSC. The Court limited the stay to the duration of the Hague Court of Appeal proceedings (excluding any further appeal) and gave JSC the liberty to apply if the Dutch process was not pursued expeditiously. Although English Courts tend to adopt a pro-enforcement policy, the interests of justice and fairness, particularly in the case of a risk challenge and conflicting judgments, can justify a stay of enforcement even when it may cause significant delay in resolution.
In LaPaglia v. Valve Corp., a U.S. federal court case, the claimant sought to vacate an arbitral award on the grounds that the sole arbitrator had allegedly “outsourced his adjudicative role to Artificial Intelligence (AI)”, raising a challenge to the boundaries of AI use in arbitration proceedings. The dispute arose from claims against Valve Corp. for antitrust violations and breach of warranty related to PC games, with the arbitrator allegedly expressing a desire to issue his award quickly due to an upcoming trip, and referencing prior use of ChatGPT for unrelated tasks. The claimant argued that the award contained “telltale signs of AI generation,” including factual inaccuracies and passages not grounded in the record, and relied on Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits vacation where an arbitrator exceeds their powers. In the present case, by allegedly delegating decision-making to AI rather than fulfilling the parties’ expectation of a human-rendered, reasoned award. The claimant referred to cases where awards were vacated due to “impostor” arbitrators, contending that outsourcing to AI undermines the legitimacy of the proceeding in a similiar manner. The claim is centered on whether an arbitrator’s use of AI in the award supplants independent human judgment or introduces unverified facts, constitutes an excess of authority and a violation of due process, especially in light of emerging guidelines for the usage of AI in arbitration ( e.g. SVAMC and Ciarb). The Court is yet to rule on the matter, but the claimant’s contention highlights important questions about the permissible scope of AI assistance in arbitration.
In HR-2025-921-A, the Norwegian Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, a challenge to an arbitral award based on alleged arbitrator impartiality, arising from a dispute in which two shareholders were found to have breached a shareholders’ agreement. The arbitral tribunal included a law firm partner whose firm had a modest, unrelated engagement for one party (handled by another department, with no personal involvement) which was not disclosed to the parties. The losing shareholders argued this undisclosed client relationship warranted setting aside the award under the Norwegian Arbitration Act (“NAA”), which requires arbitrators to be independent and impartial, mirroring the UNCITRAL Model Law and IBA Guidelines. The Supreme Court held that whether such a relationship gives rise to justifiable doubts about impartiality depends on a holistic assessment of the nature, scope, duration, and commercial importance of the client relationship, as well as the law firm’s size, the arbitrator’s role, and any personal involvement. The Court found that the engagement was low in value, unrelated, handled by others in a large firm, did not, in isolation, create justifiable doubts about impartiality, and that breach of the disclosure duty is only decisive in borderline cases. The award was upheld to iterate that only significant, relevant relationships or failures to disclose will justify disqualification or annulment of an award.
- Key insights into London International Disputes Week (LIDW) 2025
The London International Disputes Week (LIDW) 2025, held between 2 and 6 June, conducted over 60 sessions, highlighting the various major shifts in global dispute resolution. Among these sessions, discussions on international arbitration took center stage, focusing on its developing role as an established framework for dispute resolution.
Fraud and asset recovery was another theme featuring extensive dialogues addressing the escalating complexity of fraud litigation, particularly involving APP fraud, crypto scams, and digital asset tracing. The integration of AI into fraud detection and other litigation strategies was also discussed at length as possible countermeasures.
Technology and AI’s potential to transform dispute resolution methods was another recurring theme discussed across more than 20 panel sessions, particularly in the current political and global environment. However, concerns were also raised about the ethical issues and risks associated with using AI and the loss of the human element in such methods.
Overall, LIDW 2025 offered a forum for sharing international best practices and perspectives in dispute resolution. Finally, while it celebrated the achievements of traditional arbitral hubs, it equally acknowledged the rising prominence of emerging arbitral jurisdictions, like India.
On 19 June 2025, Qatar National Bank (QNB) initiated legal proceedings against the Republic of South Sudan and its central bank under the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to enforce a $1.02 billion arbitral award, as decided by ICSID in May 2024.
The dispute stems from a wartime sovereign loan agreement between QNB and South Sudan, which, following its independence in 2011, secured loans from QNB to fund essential imports, including food, fuel, and medicines for the country. A 2018 restructuring agreement later consolidated these loans into a $700 million loan, with repayments beginning in March 2019. However, South Sudan’s subsequent default in the payments triggered ICSID hearings in London in 2024, where a final award ordering South Sudan to pay over $1.02 billion, including principal, accrued interest, and legal costs, was declared.
Now, QNB is requesting that the award be recognized and enforced in the US under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention (which both the US and Qatar have ratified), which permits automatic enforcement by contracting states, and other related U.S. legal provisions.
QNB further asserts that South Sudan waived any claim to sovereign immunity by entering into a commercial loan contract with an arbitration clause, being an ICSID member, and finally, through explicitly waiving immunity in the loan agreement itself.
The U.S court’s decision on the matter is pending.
In a recent decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), the court delved into the scope of state immunity under the State Immunity Act, 1979 (SIA), in anti-suit injunctions (ASIs). The dispute arose from a contract between CMC, an Italian construction company, and a Nepalese government entity, when CMC requested an anti-suit injunction from the Singaporean courts after the Nepalese entity filed for simultaneous court proceedings in Nepal after the proceedings started.
The SICC held that, while states lose adjudicative immunity under section 11(1) of the SIA when they agree to arbitration, they still retain enforcement immunity unless specifically waived off under section 15(2)(a). A general arbitration agreement under SIAC is insufficient, and an explicit waiver or language must indicate consent to enforcement measures.
The bench further discussed the criteria necessary for granting a contractual ASI, which prevents a party from initiating foreign proceedings in violation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause or arbitration agreement. Contractual ASIs seek to uphold the parties’ contractual duties, as opposed to non-contractual ASIs, which are meant to prevent oppressive or vexatious foreign actions to safeguard the Singapore court’s jurisdiction. The court determined that three cumulative conditions must be met to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold requirements: 1) the defendant must fall under the jurisdiction of the Singaporean court; (2) the foreign proceedings must violate an arbitration agreement or exclusive jurisdiction clause; and (3) there must be no strong grounds for refusing enforcement of the agreement.
Most importantly, the SICC reiterated the parties’ duty to promptly disclose the potential issues of state immunity while seeking injunctive relief, especially while structuring contracts with state entities.
In a significant development under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), the Court of Arbitration (COA), issued a Supplemental Award of Competence in late June, reaffirming its jurisdiction to adjudicate matters between India and Pakistan, despite India’s claim to have suspended the treaty from their end.
The dispute revolves around the two Indian hydroelectric projects, Kishenganga and Ratle, which Pakistan claimed to have violated the IWT. The treaty was declared in “abeyance” by India post the Pehelgam terror attack, treating any decisions arising out of the tribunal as “legal nullity”. Pakistan, in contrast, has urged India to adhere to the treaty obligations and the tribunal’s authority.
The tribunal’s supplemental award clarified this contradiction, stating that such unilateral suspension by a party is prohibited under the IWT. Consequently, the tribunal’s decisions stay binding on both parties. The tribunal also highlighted that incidents occurring after the commencement of proceedings have no bearing on jurisdiction under customary international law. Therefore, the CoA’s ability to arbitrate the dispute remains unaffected by India’s decision to suspend the treaty.
While India has rejected the award, calling it a “charade at Pakistan’s behest,” this divide in the tribunal’s jurisdiction between the parties points out the significant limitations of international adjudication, especially when political will and mutual consent between the parties dip.
As part of its ongoing dispute with the Kishore Biyani-led Future Group, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) recently awarded Amazon ₹23.7 crore in damages, along with roughly ₹77 crore in litigation costs and S$68,550 in arbitration fees. The tribunal in its judgment decided that the Future Group has breached its contractual obligations by entering into a transaction with Reliance Retail, despite Amazon’s prior investment in Future Coupons Pvt Ltd (FCPL), a Future Retail Limited (FRL) promoter group entity.
The conflict arose in 2019 when Amazon purchased a 49% stake in FCPL for ₹1,431. This strategic move allowed Amazon to gain indirect control over FRL. However, due to financial distress in 2020, the Future Group decided to sell off its retail, logistics, and wholesale business to Reliance Retail for ₹24,713 crore.
In the judgment, the three-member tribunal did not grant the full damages of ₹1,436 crore that Amazon sought. Instead, the tribunal adopted a pragmatic balance, acknowledging the breach while considering the deteriorating commercial value of FRL, emphasising that a full award would have effectively insulated Amazon from any commercial risk by investing in a distressed company, which limited the practical value Amazon could have recovered.
Further, the cost awarded was only around 60% of the claimed litigation expenses by Amazon, as the court refused to award any costs for the parallel litigations filed by Amazon in India, thereby distinguishing between arbitration-related costs and those arising from parallel litigation.
SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
The Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. resolved the long standing ambiguity on whether Indian courts can modify arbitral awards under Section 34 of ANC Act, 1996. In a 4:1 ruling, the Court held that a limited modification is permissible, especially in cases involving severable and manifest errors like computational or clerical mistakes, without reassessing the merits of the case. The majority drew from the doctrine of implied powers and international jurisprudence (e.g., Singapore’s CAI v. CAJ) and found that modifying only the flawed portion of an award furthers justice and efficiency and complete setting aside would be disproportionate.
However, Justice KV Vishwanathan’s dissent raised sharp concerns about judicial overreach. He argued that such powers are not contemplated by the 1996 Act, unlike the repealed 1940 Act or foreign models with explicit provisions. Moreover, he warned that invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to justify such modifications violates the minimal intervention principle enshrined in Section 5 of the ANC Act. Unless strict judicial restraint is used while dealing with the modification powers of the court, it might ensue a new wave of litigation, which would defeat the purpose of alternate dispute resolution.
The Supreme Court in this case clarified that non-service of a notice under Section 21 of the ANC Act, 1996, does not bar the arbitral tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over a party if the party is otherwise bound by the arbitration agreement, either explicitly or through conduct. The Court emphasised that the Section 21 notice is procedural in nature, meant to fix the commencement date for limitation and to alert the respondent about the arbitration, and not to determine jurisdiction. It further held that even if a party was not named in the Section 11 application, they may still be impleaded during arbitration based on the tribunal’s assessment under Section 16.
In this case, although respondent nos. 2 and 3 weren’t signatories to the arbitration clause or served with the initial notice, their deep involvement in the LLP’s operations and their roles under the contract showed implied consent to arbitration. The Court reiterated that the arbitral tribunal has autonomy under Section 16 to determine its own jurisdiction, including deciding on the joinder of parties. It upheld the impleadment of the additional respondents. It thus reaffirmed the principle that substance prevails over procedural form in arbitral proceedings.
In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court lamented the rising trend of unnecessarily lengthy oral and written submissions in arbitration appeals. The 2-judge bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Pankaj Mithal emphasised that Section 37 appeals must adhere to the limited scope of Section 34 and not be treated like full-fledged appeals under the CPC. It warned that excessive argumentation, despite high monetary stakes, leads to judicial inefficiency and delays, and dilutes access to justice for the common litigant.
The Court upheld the termination of the development agreement, reaffirmed the bar against modifying arbitral awards, and dismissed L&T’s appeal. It criticised senior counsels for treating arbitration appeals as if they were plenary civil suits, leading to voluminous, often irrelevant, case citations. This judgment is a cautionary note to the Bar and Bench alike. Arbitration, meant to be swift and efficient, must not become a judicial labyrinth under the weight of verbosity.
In Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Ispat Carrier Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that an arbitral award rendered after approval of a resolution plan under the IBC is unenforceable if the underlying claim was not included in the resolution process. The Court emphasized that once a resolution plan is approved under Section 31 of the IBC, it binds all stakeholders, and extinguishes any claims not accounted for. Hence, the arbitration proceedings, though resumed post-moratorium, were without jurisdiction, which rendered the award a nullity ab initio.
The Court further clarified that Section 47 of the CPC permits a challenge to the execution of such an award on jurisdictional grounds, even if it wasn’t contested under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. This ruling reinforces the primacy of finality under the IBC and sends a clear signal to operational creditors: if you don’t stake your claim during CIRP, you can’t revive it later through arbitration or execution.
In this judgment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act applies to the calculation of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, thereby excluding the day on which the arbitral award is received. The dispute arose over whether the respondent’s application to set aside the award was time-barred. The Chhattisgarh High Court had ruled in favour of the respondent, and the Supreme Court upheld that decision. It held that the limitation clock started ticking from the day after receipt of the award.
The Bench, comprising Justices P.S. Narasimha and Prashant Kumar Mishra, observed that the application filed on 11 July 2022, being the next working day after expiry of the limitation period, was within time due to Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court drew support from earlier rulings, including Himachal Techno Engineers and My Preferred Transformation, to reiterate that the Limitation Act isn’t excluded wholesale from arbitration proceedings. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. This reinforced a pro-litigant interpretation of procedural timelines under arbitration law.
In an appeal which was as a result of the refusal of an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Supreme Court allowed an appeal against the order of the Bombay High Court and remitted the matter to arbitration. The question in the case was as to whether or not an insured could still take a dispute to arbitration after he had signed a full and final discharge voucher and received part-payment of the insurer. A meat-export company known as the appellant had incurred vast losses to its insured factory and inventory through flooding that had occurred in July 2005. Even though the appellant had claimed more than Rs. 5.7 crores under two separate insurance policy covers on the basis of fire losses, the respondent insurer had paid him only Rs. 1.88 crores and the appellant had accepted these payment amounts with force in an economical sense. Nevertheless, this did not stop the appellant from invoking the arbitration clause which the respondent declined and claimed that there was full and final settlement. The high court had ruled that since the amount was accepted without objection arbitration was out of the question. The Supreme Court differed and agreed that duress was there and the discharge voucher was within jurisdiction of the tribunal. Responding to Vidya Drolia and the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz the Court repeated that such preliminary issues may be decided by arbitral tribunals. Sole arbitrator was appointed in the form of Justice S.C. Gupte (Retd.).
The case was a batch of appeals made before the Supreme Court based on different judgments of the Delhi High Court which questioned the possibility of construing Article 20 of different Concession Agreements signed between the Municipal Corporations of Delhi and the private contractors as a valid arbitration agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A division bench with Justice Surya Kant and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh opined that, Article 20 did not have all the attributes of an effective arbitration agreement and, thus, was not capable of being covered by the Arbitration Act. On examining Part 7 of the Act, the Court explained that there must be a competent arbitration agreement which means (i) there must be a settled disposition to arbitrate, (ii) an adjudicatory procedure that is binding and (iii) also the conformity with the arbitral norms of party autonomy, the adversarial process and the neutrality. Article 20 does not perform any of these. It sent disputes to an officer of the Municipal Corporation without their common agreement, did not provide them an opportunity of impartial adjudication, oral hearings, and classical procedural fairness, and neither clearly defined the process as mediated. Whereas the words final and binding had been inserted in certain contracts, the Court was of the view that finality, by itself, could not transform a non-judicial process into arbitration. The Supreme Court thus overruled the ruling of the Delhi High Court in the SMS Ltd. and CCC Ltd. case that arbitrarily upheld the clause as arbitral, and confirmed the ruling of the High Court in the DSC Ltd. case which denied arbitration. The Court noted that Article 20 was not an arbitration clause in word, in substance or at all, but was the subject of time consuming litigation serving to frustrate the aim of an efficient dispute resolution process.
Notably, the Court denounced the intentional preparation of false arbitration clauses terming such an act as a disservice to the profession of law. It cautioned that there is even a possibility that a time in the near future, judges will make individual liability on the legal practitioners and law practitioners, who cause such malpractice, and they will also face harsh punitive measure. The Court has also requested that the judicial arm should make every attempt to utilise their own rhino, which is to quash such clauses at an early stage to avoid litigation on such matters which wastage of judicial time. The decision is a great warning to unsound legal drafting and a sign that the judiciary is determined to uphold integrity of the arbitral process by relying on clarity, accountability and early judicial intervention.
The case features the judgment of the Supreme Court regarding a civil appeal against the judgment of the Delhi High Court, and faced the question of whether at the time of appointment of arbitrators under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court could rule out some claims to be not arbitrable. A two-judge bench headed by Justices P.S. Narasimha and Manoj Misra admitted the appeal stating that the High Court committed mistake in separating the claims of the appellant into arbitrable and non-arbitrable categories. The Court explained that the right thing was just to leave the matter pertaining such issues to the arbitral tribunal. The Court affirmed that the power of identification stage of judicial review in Section 11 is more limited since it is restricted to whether the arbitration agreement exists pursuant to the Section 11(6A), introduced pursuant to the 2015 Amendment Act. This was not included in the 2019 Amendment: however, it still stands because deletion of the provision is not yet notified. Referring to the seven-Judge Bench decision In Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In SBI General Insurance v. Krish Spinning (2024), reaffirmed that the Courts were not supposed to look into the arbitrability of certain claims at this point of time. The respondent had put its faith on Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP that it could exclude non-arbitrable claims at the point of appointment, that is, by the court. The Supreme Court however dismissed this argument because such a method is in conflict with the legislative requirement and jurisprudence. The Court underlined the fact that any controversy regarding the arbitrability of certain claims, including those that are claimed to be covered by the so called excepted matters, should be brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal by way of the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
In a leave granted case under Section 11, 16 and 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as, 1996 Act) the Supreme Court in the instant case was extrapolating upon the pertinent issues of arbitratable procedure and jurisdiction. This Court was of the view that: (i) a non-service of a Section 21 notice by one of the parties does not preclude him to be impleaded in arbitral proceedings; (ii)wprocedure is limited to the appointment of the arbitral tribunal and an order under it does not have any limitation on the jurisdiction or terms of reference of the tribunal; and (iii) since the jurisdiction of the arbitral proceedings is based on the consent of the parties, the issue under Section 16 must seek to establish whether the party, in question, is Such clarifications came in the course of a case during which an arbitral tribunal had declined to implead some parties simply because they had not been served with a Section 21 notice and had not been involved in the Section 11 appointment proceedings.
HIGH COURT DEVELOPMENTS
Contractual obligations or non-performance of a contract are often excused during force majeure events which render performance unfavourable or impossible. The High Court of Delhi, in this instance, upheld an award which stated that COVID 19 was a force majeure event and due to the same the Airports Authority of India would not be entitled to receive any annual fee or monthly fee from Delhi International Airport Limited during the course of the pandemic, that was held to be till 28.2.22. Further the Court ruled that they were unable to find any inconsistencies or illegality in the award on perusing the relevant circumstances.
The Bombay High Court addressed challenges to the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 in the context of dual loan agreements executed in 2016 and 2017. The arbitration clause permitted Tata Capital to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator, while also allowing it to opt out entirely if it chose to invoke remedies under the SARFAESI or DRT Acts. The respondents resisted arbitration on grounds of lack of mutuality, estoppel due to SARFAESI invocation, and the lapse of an earlier arbitral proceeding. The Hon’ble judge, however, upheld the petitions, distinguishing the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Tata Capital Housing Finance Ltd. v. Shri Chand Construction, and reading down the one-sided opt-out clause to preserve the validity of the arbitration agreement. The Court further reiterated that parallel invocation of SARFAESI and arbitration is legally permissible. As the earlier arbitration had lapsed due to unilateral appointment, which is now now impermissible post Perkins Eastm, a fresh reference under Section 11 was held maintainable. Reaffirming the limited scope of inquiry under Section 11(6A), the Court appointed a sole arbitrator, leaving questions of jurisdiction and validity to be addressed under Section 16 by the arbitral tribunal.
In Fab Tech Works & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Savvology Games Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Comm. Arb. Appl. 419/2024), the Bombay High Court clarified that proceedings under Sections 9 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are not mutually exclusive. The dispute arose from an Investor Agreement dated 30 March 2021, under which Fab Tech invested over ₹2.8 crore in Savvology against a promise of convertible preference shares which was allegedly breached. While Fab Tech sought interim relief under Section 9 and later initiated a Section 11 application to appoint an arbitrator, the respondent objected, claiming the two were parallel and impermissible. Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan rejected this, holding that Section 9 provides temporary safeguards, whereas Section 11 enables the arbitral process, and both can be pursued simultaneously. The Court appointed an arbitrator and directed that issues of jurisdiction or modification of interim orders be addressed before the tribunal itself, reaffirming the limited role of courts at the pre-reference stage.
The Delhi High Court declined to entertain a third Section 11 application for appointment of an arbitrator, holding that the remedy stood barred due to the unconditional withdrawal of an earlier petition based on the same cause of action. The dispute pertained to encashment of a bank guarantee, against which Dewan Chand had previously filed two Section 11 petitions. While the first was withdrawn with liberty to reapproach the court, the second was unconditionally withdrawn despite the fact that by then, the invocation of the bank guarantee had already crystallized. Citing Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC and relevant precedent, the Court held that the absence of a liberty clause in the second withdrawal precluded the petitioner from initiating a fresh application on identical grounds, effectively barring the third attempt. The judgment reinforces the principle that once a claim is unconditionally withdrawn, parties cannot later revive it under the guise of a fresh cause unless expressly permitted by the court.
The Bombay High Court confronted a challenge to the appointment of Col. Vivekanand Choudhary (Retd.) as sole arbitrator in light of amendments introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. The respondent argued he was disqualified under Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule due to a relationship with the parties. The Court, however, emphasized that these restrictions are subject to waiver: despite falling within categories 1 and 5 of the Schedule, Col. Choudhary’s appointment remained valid because the parties had expressly waived in writing the applicability of the disqualification provisions, as empowered by the proviso to Section 12(5), which took effect on 23 October 2015. By upholding the waiver and affirming the appointment, the Court reinforced the autonomy of party agreements in the arbitration process.
The Delhi High Court addressed a petition seeking the appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising from an EPC contract. The respondent opposed the petition, arguing that the dispute was barred by res judicata, having already been adjudicated in prior proceedings.
The High Court firmly reiterated the principle that the court’s role at the Section 11 stage is limited to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. It emphasised that complex jurisdictional objections, including res judicata, are matters that fall within the scope of an arbitral tribunal under the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. Consequently, the court rejected the objection and appointed Justice (Retd.) Indira Shah as the sole arbitrator to conduct the proceedings.
The petitioner challenged an ex parte arbitral award passed in favour of the respondent, a subcontractor in a construction contract for the Supreme Court’s additional office complex. The respondent initiated arbitration by claiming to have issued a Section 21 notice and unilaterally appointed a sole arbitrator. The petitioner asserted that it had never received the notice, as it was sent to an incorrect address and had no knowledge of the arbitral award. The central issue was whether silence or inaction by a party could be construed as implied consent to both the appointment of an arbitrator and initiation of proceedings under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Delhi High Court held that an arbitrator cannot validly be appointed unilaterally, and mere inaction by a party to a Section 21 notice does not amount to implied consent. The court emphasised that mutual consent, either explicit or through court appointment, is essential for a valid arbitral tribunal. Since the petitioner neither received the Section 21 notice nor the award, the arbitral proceedings had not legally commenced. The court thus declared the ex parte award passed on March 15, 2016, invalid and set it aside.
The Telangana High Court, in a contractual dispute, dealt with Section 11(6)(c) application seeking the appointment of arbitrators. The arbitration clause in the agreement referred disputes to a non-defunct arbitral institution, ICADR. The respondent opposed the application, contending that the applicant should have first approached the named institution and exhausted alternative remedies. However, the applicant argued that the intention to arbitrate was clear and could not be rendered void merely because the designated institution no longer existed.
The court held that the intention to arbitrate must be given effect to, even if the named institution is no longer functional. The Court emphasised that an arbitration clause does not become unworkable merely because the institution is defunct. Accordingly, the court appointed Justice L. Nageswara Rao, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the sole arbitrator.
The Jharkhand High Court dealt with cross-appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This challenged the decision of the Commercial Court, which had entirely set aside an arbitral award. The award had arisen from disputes under a Concessionaire Agreement for municipal solid waste management services.
The Commercial Court, citing fraud in one claim, set aside the entire arbitral award, including unrelated and severable components. A2Z Waste Management appealed this finding, while RMC filed a delayed cross-appeal to restore counterclaims allowed by the tribunal. The High Court allowed the Contractor’s appeal, holding that the fraud in one aspect did not justify setting aside the full award. It restored the arbitral award partially. The court also dismissed RMC’s cross appeal, refusing to condone a 320-day delay, and held that government bodies are not entitled to leniency on limitation without sufficient cause.
- The Limitation for invoking Arbitration begins from the Date of Notice and not from the Date of Accrual of the Cause of Action
(Sinsiwar Construction Co. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Raj 2244)
The Rajasthan High Court, in an application for Section 11(6), addressed the issue of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute arose from a construction contract with BSNL, which was terminated in 2019. The petitioner invoked arbitration in 2021, but BNSL failed to respond or appoint an arbitrator as per the contract.
BSNL argued that the application was barred by limitation since the cause of action accrued in 2019. However, the petitioner relied on Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. to argue that the limitation period begins from the date of service of the arbitration notice. The High Court accepted the argument, holding that the limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, commences from the date of service of notice invoking arbitration, not from the date of termination or accrual of the original cause of action.
In Bombay High Court, the judgment by Justice, Somasekhar Sundaresan states that a contractor can be paid on some extra work done other than the scope of the contract, when the other party has led him/her to believe clearly through its actions, that there is an expression of its agreement to this work. This is because, by accepting the work, measuring it and failing to object at the time the work was done, the party at whose benefit the work is performed is not able to subsequently argue that the contractor was not entitled to the amount of the work performed because it was beyond the capacities of the contract. This would be the enriching at the expense of another. The Court emphasized that the project was done following the Agreement and with the active supervision of Railway officials especially during COVID-19 lockdown. Such time extension was given considering prevailing conditions on the ground. The Railways had some counterclaims against performance deficiencies, but they never brought this to arbitration. Welcoming joint measurements, certification of RA Bills, and the identical preceding actions proved how the extra job was approved of. The Court supported the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal according to which the behaviour of the Railways indicated that there was a consensual and written extension of the contractual scope and a formal amendment could not be used to exclude the payment. The reasons were considered as reasonable and well-founded as those of Tribunal.
Bombay High Court has confirmed an arbitral award of 538.9 crore in favor of Kochi Cricket Private Limited (KCPL), parent company of the defunct team in the Indian Premier League (IPL) Kochi Tuskers Kerala. The Court also stated that it cannot take the place of first appellate court by reversing evidence, reconducting the assessment of contract clauses, or listening to alternative interpretations of the contracts under the pretense that they are perverted. As the judgment delivered by Justice Riyaz Iqbal Chagla states, the Arbitrator had not only discussed the central issue, namely whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) had acted wrongfully in invoking the bank guarantee given by Rendezvous Sports World (RSW), and whether this action by it was a repudiatory breach of the Franchise Agreement (KCPL-FA) given by KCPL to BCCI. The Arbitrator came to his conclusions after analysing the documents, facts and evidence (on record) in great detail.
In a judgment pronounced by Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya of Calcutta High Court, the court held that where arbitration proceedings are instituted under Section 18(3) of the MSME Act there can be no way going back to the institutional pre-arbitral conciliation stage. Such a reversal was not an immediate one on the part of the Council itself, but it was only with the request of the petitioner, with whom it then followed several other directions of amicable settlement, and in pursuance of which the arbitration was still proceeding. Failing in these efforts at reciprocal settlement, the Council decided the matter on the merits. The Court also made it clear that, the provisions of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be applied to the arbitration form under the MSME Act, 2006. Rather, the provisions applicable there are to be found in Section 18(5) of the 2006 Act. This 90-day is, however, not meant to be binding but directory. The Court has noted that unlike Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act- which has the effect of a penalty in the case of delays- Section 18(5) of the MSME Act merely provides a time frame of 90 days during which arbitration should be concluded but there is no penalty in case a failure to comply. What this means is that the provision is an instruction but not a compulsory matter.
Justice Shampa Sarkar of the Calcutta High Court was of the view that, at the present stage, the interests of the petitioner will be sufficed under the schedule annexed to deed of hypothecation. The respondent is still in business, and nothing in the pleadings seems to show that it is trying to despoil and alienate assets to render any possible award in favour of the petitioner unfruitful. The Court noted that there is no supporting evidence on the side of the petitioner because the amount claimed by him is 53.61 crores is not substantiated by any admission of the respondent. Although the petitioner had executed some investments at 12.41 crores, some of the investments that were revealed during proceedings had an evaluation of 41.04 crores. Even though the petitioner challenged these valuations, it did not give any particular calculations to contradict the said valuations. The Court observed that conducting such an assessment would literally be a mini-trial, especially when the values of the investment are per se the subject of fluctuations in the market. It also stated that the charge on these investments was created voluntarily by parties who have had experience in commerce and it cannot be shown there was any mala fide conduct on the part of the respondent.
In the case of Coogee Investment P Ltd, the Calcutta High Court in a ruling given by Justice Aniruddha Roy said it was not proper to implead the arbitrator at such preliminary stage when an application under section 36(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, seeking an unconditional stay of an arbitral award on the ground of fraud or corruption, is still pending. Addition of the arbitrator as a party is not necessary or legally acceptable unless the Court on perusal of the application is of a prima facie opinion that the award could have been obtained as a result of fraud or corruption. The Court also noted that the above application seems to have been made on the basis of decisions of the Supreme Court in Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain and Microsoft Corporation in both of which the decisions were given in a Section 34 proceedings. Although a Section 34 court only has a right to scrutinize the award at a superficial level, they must determine in the process whether there are fractions of fraud, corruption or bias involved. In the case of unconditional stay under Section 36(2) the applicant should clearly show that award was vitiated by fraud or corruption or in accordance with Section 36(3). It is not enough to declare bias out rightly without proving fraud or corruption.
The Chhattisgarh High Court including Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru has, however, in a case, held that, a party cannot claim reliefs before the writ court, which are substantially similar to reliefs taken up already before the Arbitrator, and then before the Commercial Court, especially where there are adequate and efficacy alternative remedies available under the same legal or legislative regime. Looking at the record, the Court observed that the case concerned two Contract Agreements of 26.04.2017 and 18.09.2017 respectively. It was noticed that the petitioner had already questioned the Contract Agreement of 26.04.2017 before a Sole Arbitrator which resulted in an order dated 15.03.2022 in favour of the petitioner after which a final arbitral award was made. The respondents then challenged the said award by filing Case No. Arb. MJC 06 of 2024 at the commercial Court. The Commercial Court however considering this challenge rejected the same via its order dated 08.11.2024. Considering such proceedings, the High Court ruled that the filing of its writ jurisdiction was unnecessary, and unacceptable, with the statutory remedies having existed and been exhausted by the right courts.
In the case BNP Paribas (formerly Fortis) v. Axis Bank, Justice Amit Mahajan of the Delhi High Court, in a judgment passed in June 2022, held that an express mention of certain assets in a provisional attachment order does not remove jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal. In a similar way, an investigation under Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or Enforcement Directorate (ED) in regard to a purported fraud involvement does not lead to a discontinuation of an arbitration proceedings. The Court confirmed that arbitration may well continue, despite some part of the controversy being subject to criminal proceedings at the same time. The Court also added that the judicial authority to conduct judicial review on the basis of Article 227 of the Constitution is very small and must be used with caution. In as much as the courts have the discretion to do so, they should strictly do so on a need basis that should be characterized by apparent perversity. Resting on the decision of the Supreme Court in Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC (2020), the Court stated once again that Article 227 should not be relied on as a possible way to avoid the arbitration procedure and must be applied only exceptionally. More so, mere allegation of fraud could not automatically make a dispute non-arbitrable. Observing that the Supreme Court made a distinction between, on the one hand, mere statements of fraud, and, on the other, very weighty allegations affecting the validity of the arbitration agreement itself (see A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016)), the Court found that the judgment of the High Court does not find any fault in the reasoning given by the Supreme Court. Arbitration would not be available in only the latter case.
The Delhi High Court whilst passing a judgment by Justice Ravinder Dudeja observed that when a valid plaint is filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court is bound to refer the parties to arbitration and even refuse to entertain the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 on the ground that the civil law bars the suit. No such application or request to refer the matter to arbitration being possible, however, it is argued that on the mere fact that the agreement contains an arbitration clause, the plaint stands to be rejected in terms of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court also banked on the ruling in *Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. Vs. SBI Home Finance Ltd.* in 2011, wherein the Supreme Court prescribed a five-pronged test to be applied by the courts in making decisions concerning the suitability of referring parties to arbitration under Section 8. These considerations are: (i) presence of a valid arbitration agreement; (ii) presence of all parties of the suit to the arbitration agreement (iii) filability of the subject matter of the dispute within the arbitration agreement; (iv) filability of the issues that are to be determined; and (v) filing under Section 8 prior to the presentation of the first statement of the actual dispute. It recalls the decision of the ruling that reference to arbitration is compulsory under Section 8 unless a good arbitration agreement in place is not determined by the Court.
The Gujarat High Court, comprising Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray, held that once a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—due to its being filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) and its proviso—any observations or findings regarding the validity of the arbitral award, including claims of it being void ab initio, are without legal sanctity. The Court emphasized that entertaining such a time-barred application constitutes a serious error of law.
The respondent had argued that the arbitral award was a nullity on the grounds that no arbitration agreement existed and that the arbitrator had been unilaterally appointed by the Surat Adatiya Kapda Association without their consent. However, the Court categorically held that such objections to the validity of the arbitral proceedings could not be considered, as the challenge under Section 34 was itself barred by limitation. Consequently, the Court concluded that no adjudication on the merits of the award or the arbitral process was permissible.
Society For Excellence in Arbitration Law, RMLNLU 
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