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JULY – SEPTEMBER 2025 QUARTERLY ROUND-UP

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By: Aarini Joshi, Aditya Mishra, Amol Krishn Patel, Bhumika Singh, Khushi Sharath Verma, Pallakshi Pandiya, Saara Gaur, Tarun Kumar, Ujjwal Gupta

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

  • UNCITRAL makes significant progress towards more efficient and reliable international trade at its 58th session (58th annual session)

At its 58th annual session,  in Vienna, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) made significant progress in advancing a modern, harmonised framework for global commerce. The Commission adopted key legal instruments, including the draft Convention on Negotiable Cargo Documents, the Toolkit on Asset Tracing and Recovery in Insolvency Proceedings, and the Toolkit on the Prevention and Mitigation of International Investment Disputes, which form part of UNCITRAL’s ongoing Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) reform. It also approved the publication of two model organisational templates for Limited Liability Enterprises, a joint UNCITRAL/UNIDROIT study on the legal nature of verified carbon credits, and guidance on distributed ledger technology (DLT) in trade. The session reviewed the progress of working groups addressing issues such as recognition and enforcement of electronic arbitral awards, applicable law in insolvency, and data provision contracts, while authorizing new workstreams on digital payments, decentralised autonomous organizations (DAOs), digital platforms, and paperless trade. Beyond legislative work, UNCITRAL emphasised capacity building, the expansion of UNCITRAL Days’ academic initiatives, and CLOUT database modernisation to promote uniform interpretation of trade law. It also welcomed El Salvador’s accession to the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, marking another step toward global digitalisation of trade ahead of UNCITRAL’s 60th anniversary in 2026.

At the 2025 ICC China Arbitration Day, held in Beijing on July 2, 2025, leading practitioners, in-house counsel, and academics examined the evolving trends in international dispute resolution within China and globally. The event, attended by over 200 participants, reflected China’s growing engagement with global arbitration standards and its forthcoming 2026 amendment to the Arbitration Act, the first in three decades, which introduces provisions on interim measures, ad hoc arbitration, and the seat of arbitration principle. Discussions on expedited arbitration procedures underscored their increasing adoption by SOEs and multinational corporations seeking efficiency and predictability, with the ICC reporting nearly 900 expedited cases since 2017. A parallel panel on ICC Dispute Board Rules provided insights into their integration into medium- and long-term contracts, particularly in Belt and Road infrastructure projects, as a preventive tool for dispute management. These mechanisms, embedded in the ICC’s 2015 Dispute Board Rules, enable ongoing monitoring and early resolution of technical and contractual issues, minimizing arbitration escalation. By aligning domestic practices with global standards and emphasizing proactive dispute prevention, the conference highlighted China’s steady shift toward a more sophisticated, efficiency-driven arbitration ecosystem, one combining legal modernisation with pragmatic industry engagement in international commercial dispute resolution.

In July 2025, China’s arbitration framework reached a pivotal stage of reform and institutional advancement, reflecting its commitment to aligning domestic arbitration practices with international standards. Following directives from the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Ministry of Justice convened a national symposium reaffirming the policy goal of cultivating 22 world-class arbitration institutions, including CIETAC, SHIAC, BAC/BIAC, and SCIA. This state-led strategy seeks to combine Chinese legal characteristics with global best practices, supporting major national initiatives such as the Greater Bay Area and Hainan Free Trade Port. The July 2025 symposium emphasized enhancing institutional governance, professional capacity building, and international collaboration as part of this development blueprint. Official data revealed that China now has 285 arbitration institutions and over 60,000 arbitrators, including 3,400 foreign professionals, collectively handling 4,373 foreign-related cases in 2024, valued at RMB 197.8 billion (approximately USD 27.2 billion). The discussions also reinforced the ongoing legislative reform of China’s Arbitration Law, expected to be enacted later in 2025, marking the most comprehensive modernisation of the law in nearly thirty years. Together, these July 2025 developments signal China’s determination to establish itself as a global leader in arbitration, both in scale and sophistication.

In July 2025, the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) reaffirmed key principles governing the recognition of arbitral awards against sovereign States in Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela. The Court held that sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is not absolute and can be explicitly or implicitly waived through a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or a settlement agreement, both of which Venezuela had entered into. Importantly, the Court distinguished jurisdictional immunity, which prevents a State from being sued, from execution immunity, which protects its assets from seizure. Since the proceedings concerned only recognition, not enforcement, the latter was deemed irrelevant.

On public policy, the STJ adopted a restrictive interpretation, holding that recognition may only be denied if the award’s outcome is manifestly intolerable to the forum’s legal order. Allegations that the award violated environmental or community rights were dismissed as unsubstantiated. By emphasizing party consent, good faith, and legal coherence, the decision illustrates the growing international consensus that state immunity cannot be used to evade arbitral obligations once validly waived. It strengthens Portugal’s pro-arbitration stance and contributes to the harmonization of state immunity doctrine in international investment arbitration.

In July 2025, an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal ruled on the dispute between Chile’s Codelco and Ecuador’s state miner Enami EP over the Llurimagua copper project. The tribunal found Ecuador breached its contractual obligations by failing to finalize a joint venture agreement but awarded only USD 25.3 million of the USD 568 million claimed.

Ecuador’s Attorney General hailed the ruling as a legal and financial victory, avoiding over USD 540 million in potential damages, while Codelco underscored the finding of Ecuador’s civil liability and its failure to negotiate in good faith. The tribunal also rejected Ecuador’s demand for Codelco’s geological data, affirming Codelco’s ownership. The decision underscores key arbitration principles, limited damages despite liability, good-faith obligations, and measured judicial discretion. A separate ICSID arbitration launched by Codelco in 2022 over the same project remains ongoing.

On 1 August 2025, the Arbitration Act 2025 came into force in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, marking a significant milestone in the field of international arbitration. The above Act replaces certain sections of the 1996 framework and updates significant provisions in accordance with the Law Commission’s review for the period 2022–2024.

  • Arbitration Act 2025: Strengthening the UK’s position in International Arbitration

It introduces a default rule that the law of the seat is the governing law of arbitration agreements, thereby resolving the uncertainty created by Enka v. Chubb (2020) UKSC 38. It also codifies the duty of disclosure of arbitrators as developed in the case of Halliburton v. Chubb (2020) UKSC 48. The Act formalizes the powers of emergency arbitrators and allows the summary dismissal of unmeritorious claims. These changes enhance procedural efficiency.

The reform is welcomed by the LCIA and practitioners worldwide, as it will ensure that UK arbitration law will remain transparent, modern, and consistent with global best practices, further solidifying London’s role as a trusted arbitration seat.

  • Hong Kong Court Refuses to Grant Anti-Suit Injunction in Arbitration Dispute

In Hyalroute Communication Group Ltd v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Ltd (2025) HKCFI 2417, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance refused to grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain winding-up proceedings in the Cayman Islands. The Court held that foreign proceedings would not definitively determine the debt issue, thus they did not constitute a breach of the arbitration clause in the Term Facility Agreement.

This judgment testifies to Hong Kong’s arbitration-friendly stance and adherence to cross-border judicial comity. It aligns the local practice with that of other advanced jurisdictions in supporting arbitration. The result is to further establish Hong Kong as a neutral and commercially aware arbitration center.

  • Court of Arbitration Issues Award in Indus Waters Treaty Dispute

On 8 August 2025, the Court of Arbitration delivered its Award on Issues of General Interpretation regarding the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Republic of India. Pakistan had launched the proceedings challenging India’s construction of run-of-river hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers.

The Award provides clear guidance on the interpretation and application of the design and engineering provisions of the Treaty. It outlines what hydroelectric projects are permissible within the framework of the Treaty. This critical decision has significant implications in international water law and treaty arbitration. It balances environmental sustainability with India’s energy needs, as well as the duties and responsibilities of both parties under the Indus Waters Treaty.

  • CIArb Expands to Northern Territory, Australia

On 14 August 2025, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators launched its Northern Territory Chapter in Darwin, Australia, significantly expanding arbitration and ADR infrastructure across Asia and the Pacific. The newly established chapter aims to enhance local dispute resolution capabilities in key sectors, including construction, mining, and energy. It is also envisaged to offer training and development opportunities to practitioners.

This initiative demonstrates the CIArb’s commitment to making arbitration available outside traditional centers. It strengthens regional involvement in international dispute-resolution networks. The Darwin chapter is expected to link Australia’s domestic arbitration system to the broader global arbitration community, thereby helping to better incorporate the Northern Territory into the growing network of arbitration across Asia.

  • SIAC Launches Restructuring & Insolvency Arbitration Protocol

On 26 August 2025, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre introduced its Restructuring and Insolvency Arbitration Protocol, a first in the world. The protocol provides a clear structure for resolving cross-border insolvency and restructuring disputes through arbitration.

This initiative demonstrates SIAC’s response to the increasing interplay between arbitration and insolvency law. This should enhance certainty, efficiency, and coordination in complex, multijurisdictional cases. The RIA Protocol is likely to inspire similar initiatives by other arbitral institutions.

  • India’s Arbitration Vision and Global Dialogue at Singapore Convention Week

During Singapore Convention Week 2025, from August 25 to 29, the global arbitration community witnessed two significant developments that underscored the increasing role of Asia in international dispute resolution.

On 28 August 2025, the Law Minister of India presented the country’s vision for reforming arbitration. He confirmed India’s ambition to become a global center for arbitration. The minister discussed new legislation and institutional measures to be implemented, which would lead to improvements in India’s arbitration efficiency, transparency, and compatibility with the world’s best practices. This announcement was a clear indication of India’s utmost resolve to adhere to the highest international practices in the arbitration sector, while simultaneously building trust in its arbitration institutions.

On the same day, a seminar named “Evolution and Revolution: International Disputes in the Age of Tariffs and Treaty Shifts” gathered the best arbitrators, scholars, and policy-makers. It addressed global trade tensions, evolving treaty systems, and protectionist measures, thereby giving rise to new dynamics in investment treaty and commercial arbitration. The experts pointed out that the international economy is not only becoming more complex but also evolving rapidly; hence, the need for flexible arbitration models that can cope with the intricate and multidimensional cross-border disputes is pressing.

The case concerns the enforcement of a SIAC arbitral award worth US $235 million obtained by Qatar Holding LLC, a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority, against Byju Raveendran, co-founder of India’s ed-tech startup Byju’s, and his Singapore-based entity, Byju’s Investments Pte Ltd. The dispute arose from a 2022 loan agreement of US $150 million advanced by Qatar Holding to finance the acquisition of Aakash Educational Services Ltd., which was personally guaranteed by Raveendran. Following multiple defaults, Qatar Holding terminated the loan and sought repayment under a mandatory early repayment clause.

A SIAC tribunal seated in London, comprising Lord Mance, Ian Glick KC, and Sir Bernard Rix, upheld Qatar Holding’s claim for the full sum plus interest. The award followed emergency measures granted by Stuart Isaacs KC freezing the respondents’ assets up to US $235 million, later enforced by the Singapore High Court. In August 2025, Qatar Holding petitioned the Karnataka High Court for enforcement of the award, also claiming US $14 million in accrued interest.

On 11 September 2024, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators released its Guidelines on Third Party Funding in Arbitration, offering a comprehensive framework for how funding arrangements impact arbitral stakeholders, including parties, tribunals, and institutions. The Guidelines addressed the processes for securing funding, negotiating funding agreements, and managing funder involvement in arbitral proceedings. Key provisions include due diligence on funders, clarity on the “waterfall” distribution of recoveries, termination rights, and safeguards against excessive funder control over claims. The guidelines emphasize the importance of obtaining informed legal and commercial advice when entering such funding arrangements.

The Guidelines also address disclosure obligations, endorsing limited early disclosure of the existence and identity of funders to avoid conflicts of interest, aligning with recent institutional rules under ICSID, ICC, SCC, and SIAC. The Guidelines consolidate global best practices and aim to serve as a valuable resource for practitioners to understand the growing complexity of third-party funding in international arbitration.

  • Supreme Court of Canada Declines to Hear Appeals on Setting Aside and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

On September 18 and 19, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in two significant arbitration-related matters, thereby leaving intact the appellate rulings of Ontario and Québec. In Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias against even one arbitrator requires an international arbitral award to be set aside, regardless of whether the bias influenced the result. The decision underscores the absolute nature of impartiality in arbitration, confirming that “the bias of one member taints the tribunal.” The Court rejected arguments that bias could be balanced against the fairness of the outcome, emphasizing that parties are entitled to a fully impartial panel under the Model Law frameworks.

In Republic of India v. CCDM Holdings (Devas), the Québec Court of Appeal confirmed that a state’s agreement to arbitrate constitutes an explicit waiver of jurisdictional immunity under Canada’s State Immunity Act. The Court further allowed pre-judgment asset seizure before determining state immunity and recognized enforcement rights against a state’s alter egos. With the Supreme Court declining review, both rulings strengthen Canada’s pro-enforcement stance toward international arbitration awards and reinforce the judiciary’s intolerance for arbitrator bias.

A cross-border dispute between US-based UpHealth Holdings Inc. and India’s Glocal Healthcare Systems Pvt. Ltd. has been resolved through a settlement approved by both the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and the Calcutta High Court. The case originated from an International Chamber of Commerce arbitration in which UpHealth was awarded over US$110 million in March 2024, arising from a dispute concerning the sale of Glocal’s Indian healthcare business. Facing bankruptcy proceedings, UpHealth reached an agreement with Glocal to settle the award for a payment of US $10 million.

Under the settlement, Glocal will receive a US$37.5 million claim in UpHealth’s bankruptcy proceedings, resulting in a net gain of approximately US$27.5 million after the settlement payment. The agreement effectively nullifies the original ICC award and releases all of UpHealth’s claims against Glocal’s assets, shareholdings, and intellectual property. The resolution, endorsed by courts in both jurisdictions, marks a rare instance of coordinated cross-border enforcement and settlement of an arbitral award between Indian and US entities, reflecting a pragmatic approach to balancing insolvency proceedings and arbitral finality.

The Malaysian airline group that owns AirAsia has moved to challenge a Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) award arising from a high-value fintech dispute. The arbitration was initiated by the founders of a Singapore-based fintech company, who claimed approximately US$183 million in compensation for their shareholdings. A tribunal under the SIAC Rules issued an award in favour of the fintech company’s founders, holding the Malaysian group liable.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, the airline group has filed an application before the Singapore courts seeking to set aside the award, arguing for its annulment on procedural and substantive grounds. The case will now proceed to a set-aside hearing, where the court will determine whether the award should be upheld or vacated. The challenge highlights the continued judicial scrutiny of high-value commercial awards rendered by SIAC, underscoring the significance of Singapore as both a leading arbitral seat and a jurisdiction known for its narrow approach to setting aside arbitral awards.

SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS

  •  Enabling language does not create a binding arbitration agreement

The Supreme Court ruled that an arbitration clause with the phrase “may be sought” does not constitute a binding arbitration agreement in the case of BGM and M-RPL- JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s refusal to refer the parties to arbitration, holding that the clause in question did not create a binding arbitration agreement. The Court observed that permissive language such as “may be referred” or “may be sought” merely provides an option and does not reflect a mandatory obligation to arbitrate. Emphasizing that arbitration requires clear and unambiguous mutual consent at the time of contract formation, the Court ruled that a clause contemplating future consent cannot qualify as an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Relying on prior precedents, the bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Manoj Misra reiterated that mere mention or heading of “arbitration” is insufficient where the operative language is optional. Clause 13, in this case, was therefore held to be only a permissive mode of dispute resolution.

  • Disputes related to eviction and recovery of lease rentals

The case HLV Limited vs. Airports Authority of India (AAI) centers on the question of whether disputes related to eviction and recovery of dues under specific lease deeds fall within the scope of the existing arbitration agreements between the parties. The Court’s order arises from an appeal against a Bombay High Court judgment dated June 9, 2025. The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s decision that disputes concerning eviction and recovery of lease rentals do not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreements between the parties. The dispute arose when AAI initiated eviction proceedings under Chapter VA of the AAI Act, which HLV Limited challenged, arguing that the matter should be referred to arbitration under the lease deeds. The High Court held that the arbitration clause did not extend to issues of eviction or recovery of dues arising from unauthorized occupation, as the AAI Act provides a specific statutory mechanism that overrides the general arbitration clause. The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere, observing that the statutory process for eviction was applicable and that arbitration could proceed only on other broader contractual issues between the parties.

  • Disputes Arising Out Of ‘Work Contract’ With MP Govt Instrumentality Shall Be Referred To MP Arbitration Tribunal 

In the case of UMRI POOPH PRATAPPUR (UPP) TOLLWAYS PVT. LTD. VERSUS M.P. ROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, The Supreme Court held that a private company performing a public function is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, affirming that public law remedies apply in such cases. It further ruled that disputes arising from a “works contract” must be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“1983 Act”). The Court clarified that this statutory arbitration mechanism overrides any private arbitration clause in the contract. Accordingly, UPP Tollways could not bypass the Tribunal and was bound by the special law governing such disputes. Upholding the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision, the bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan found no infirmity in quashing the private arbitration proceedings, reaffirming the Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the State or its instrumentalities under the 1983 Act.

The Supreme Court has allowed arbitration to proceed in the alleged ₹1,500-crore Bihar PDS scam, holding that the mere pendency of criminal proceedings for offences like cheating or criminal breach of trust does not bar arbitration. A Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Manoj Misra dismissed BSFSC’s challenge to the High Court’s decision appointing an arbitrator, emphasising that once a valid arbitration agreement is found, the court’s role at the referral stage ends, as reinforced in In Re: Interplay. The Court examined the argument on arbitrability of fraud and reiterated the distinction between “serious fraud” affecting public interest or vitiating the arbitration agreement (non-arbitrable) and “simple fraud” arising from contractual disputes (arbitrable), relying on the tests laid down in Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings. Since the allegations neither invalidated the arbitration clause nor involved public law elements, the Court held that the dispute remains arbitrable and directed that all contentions be addressed before the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, the appeals were rejected. 

The Supreme Court has held that when an arbitration agreement does not expressly mention the seat or venue of arbitration, the place where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred under the contract will be treated as the arbitral seat. A Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar set aside a Punjab & Haryana High Court order that had appointed an arbitrator despite the agreement vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Bombay High Court. Referring to Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. (2020), the Court reiterated that where parties choose a particular court’s exclusive jurisdiction, that court alone has authority over arbitration matters, even without express reference to the term “seat.” The Court noted that the contract’s clause submitting disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court must be read in the arbitration context, meaning Mumbai is to be treated as the arbitral seat. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. 

The Supreme Court has ruled that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot be present during arbitration proceedings, holding that only the parties who have signed the agreement can participate. A Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar overturned a Delhi High Court order that had permitted a non-signatory to attend proceedings through counsel, clarifying that arbitration is strictly between signatories and awards do not bind non-parties under Section 35 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute arose from a family settlement formalised in 2019 between Pawan Gupta and Kamal Gupta, which excluded Rahul Gupta, who nevertheless sought to take part in arbitration invoked under the settlement. Although the High Court eventually allowed his presence post-referral, the Supreme Court held that there is no legal right for a non-party to attend, and their only remedy lies under Section 36 — to resist enforcement if an award is attempted against them. The Court also stressed that allowing a stranger to observe arbitration would violate Section 42A, which mandates confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order was set aside.

The Supreme Court has held that the absence of a physical signature on an arbitration agreement does not prevent reference to arbitration if parties have otherwise clearly consented to arbitrate. A Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma set aside a Delhi High Court order that refused to refer the dispute to arbitration solely because Respondent No. 1 had not signed the agreement. Since the respondent had accepted the contractual terms through email, the Court ruled that consent in writing was established, satisfying Section 7 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Relying on Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd. (2015), the Court reiterated that an arbitration agreement need not always be signed if mutual assent is evident through written communication such as emails or exchange of pleadings. The judgment emphasised that in modern commercial dealings, including e-commerce and standard-form contracts, identities and agreement records are sufficient to constitute a valid arbitration clause where the parties are clearly ad idem. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court restored the matter to the High Court to make the reference to arbitration as per law. 

The above case revolved around the issue of whether a contractual clause prohibits the payment of pendente lite interest (i.e., interest accrued during the period when the arbitration is pending) on the sum awarded, specifically interest accrued during the arbitration proceedings. Int the said case, clause 18.1 of the contract between the parties stated: “No interest shall be payable by ONGC on any delayed payment/disputed claim.” The clause, however, did not throw light on the payment of pendente lite interest. The court, in the reasoning, observed that the said clause, when read as a whole, does not expressly or impliedly prohibit grant of pendente lite interest by the arbitral tribunal. It merely states that there would be no interest payable by the Corporation on any delayed payment/disputed claim – neither does it bar the arbitral tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest, nor does it mention that interest would not be payable in any respect whatsoever. The court in its reasonin,g referred to Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Director v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (India) Ltd. (THDC) to infer that a clause merely barring award of interest on delayed payment by itself will not be readily inferred as a bar to award pendente-lite interest by the arbitral tribunal. The said clause did not deprive the tribunal’s statutory discretion under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 to award pendente lite interest.

A dispute arose between the parties which led to termination of the MoU between them and the case was referred to arbitration. The arbitral tribunal passed an award entitling the claimant to 21% interest p.a. from the date it was given to the date it is repaid. Thereafter, the respondent filed a calculation sheet before the executing court claiming compound interest over and above the rate of interest, i.e. 21%, as awarded by the arbitral tribunal. The executing court held that it could not go beyond the award passed by the arbitral tribunal and that the decree holder was not entitled for compound interest as claimed.

The Court, from a conjoint analysis of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, discerned that the parties possess the autonomy to determine the interest and the rate of interest for the aforesaid period. It held that clause (a) (i.e. discretion of the arbitral tribunal to award interest) is subject to agreement by and between the parties. Therefore, party autonomy takes precedence over the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. The discretion to grant interest would only be available to the arbitral tribunal in absence of a clause with respect to the same. The Court determined that clause (b) of section 31 is subject to award of interest by the arbitral tribunal. If it awards interest, then the same shall be applicable from the date of the award till the date of payment; if not, then the ‘sum’ as adjudged under clause (a) shall carry interest at the rate of 18%.

The court referred to The State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora where it was held that Section 31(7) makes no reference to payment of compound interest or payment of interest upon interest. It was held that in the absence of any provision for interest upon interest in the contract, arbitral tribunals do not have the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period.

It was ultimately determined that Section 31(7) merely authorizes the arbitral tribunal to award interest in accordance with the contract and in the absence of specific provision relating to interest in the contract, to award simple interest at such rates as it deems fit from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date of payment.

The court therefore ruled that the respondent was not entitled to compound interest on the basis of the MoU and ultimately upheld the order of the arbitral tribunal.

SEPCO is a Chinese contractor whose services were employed by GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. for the of construction of three 350 Mega Watt coal-fired thermal power plants at the village of Kamalanga in Dhenkanal, Odisha. As numerous disputes are said to have arisen between the parties, SEPCO went on to demobilize from the sites of construction of the concerned project midway (in 2015) and the matter progressed before an arbitral tribunal in Singapore in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. SEPCO’s primary contention before the tribunal was that the contract did not make sending formal written notices a strict requirement. The Tribunal, while agreeing that SEPCO hadn’t produced sufficient proof that it delivered the required notices, inferred a waiver of the requirement from an email exchange between GMRKE’s representative and SEPCO and thereby concluded that GMRKE couldn’t later claim SEPCO failed to give notices. Despite the contention of GMRKE Limited on such an impossibility owing to the “No Oral Modification” clause, equitable estoppel was deemed to have arisen in March 2012 by the tribunal. SEPCO was entitled INR 950 crore as a result of the award. The matter was appealed before the Odisha High Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where the Division Bench set aside the award. SEPCO challenged this verdict before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed SEPCO’s appeal and affirmed the Orissa High Court Division Bench’s decision to set aside the arbitral tribunal’s verdict. It was observed by the Court that the tribunal was lenient while enforcing SEPCO’s obligations and thus deemed the award to be discriminatory in nature and hence violative of the equality principle enshrined under Section 18 of the 1996 Act. Furthermore, the Court quoted “placing the Arbitral Award in juxtaposition to the scope of doctrine Wednesbury Reasonableness no form of reasonability would allow for such a discrimination between the parties by an Arbitral Tribunal”. Section 28(3), which requires tribunals to decide the matter at hand in accordance with contract and trade usages, was also violated when the tribunal rewrote the contract by inferring a waiver/estoppel against express “No Oral Modification/No Waiver” clauses without unequivocal evidence. The court also held that due it’s discriminatory nature, the award “went against the public policy of India” and the principles of natural justice. Therefore, it could not be severed and had to be set aside as a whole.

HIGH COURT DEVELOPMENTS

The case dealt with whether the unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator violates Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly in light of Supreme Court precedents like Perkins Eastman Architects and CORE. The petitioner argued that Clause 39.2 of the General Conditions of Contract, which allowed the respondent’s nominee to become sole arbitrator upon the petitioner’s failure to appoint, was hit by these judgments. The petitions were dismissed. The court held that the default clause was triggered when Power Grid failed to appoint its arbitrator within 60 days. The court interpreted “failure” under Clause 39.2 as simply failure to appoint within the stipulated time, not the raising of objections to the invocation notice. The court refused to terminate the arbitrator’s mandate.

The Orissa High Court stated that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the powers of courts under Section 34 and Section 37 are strictly circumscribed. A court cannot act as an appellate body and re-examine evidence or substitute its own view for that of the arbitrator. Intervention is warranted only when an award is shown to suffer from patent illegality, a breach of natural justice, or be contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. Moreover, an appeal under Section 37 must remain within the confines of Section 34; it is not a fresh merits review. The appellate court’s role is supervisory, not substitutive, checking whether the earlier court exercising Section 34 acted within its legal limits. If the arbitrator’s decision is based on a possible view of the facts and contract, even if not the one a court might prefer, it must be left undisturbed.

The key issue was whether parties in concession agreements with NHAI must nominate their arbitrators exclusively from the Society for Affordable Redressal of Disputes (“SAROD”) panel, or whether they have autonomy to nominate arbitrators from outside the panel. The petitioners argued this restriction violated party autonomy principles emphasised in CORE. All petitions were dismissed. The court held that Rules 11.2 and 11.4 of the SAROD Rules, when read harmoniously, require both nominee arbitrators and the presiding arbitrator to be appointed from the SAROD panel for claims exceeding Rs. 3 crores. The court found the SAROD panel to be broad-based (92 arbitrators from diverse fields, including former Supreme Court and High Court judges), thus not compromising party autonomy or impartiality. The court distinguished this from CORE, noting SAROD is jointly run by NHAI and the National Highways Builders Federation with equal participation.​

The Delhi High Court granted an anti-arbitration injunction to halt proceedings in a Singapore-seated ICC arbitration, in an exercise of inherent powers to prevent vexatious and oppressive conduct. This controversial ruling resurrected concerns about Indian courts intervening in foreign-seated arbitrations, similar to the pre-Bhatia International era. The court framed the intervention as necessary to protect an Indian public sector undertaking from procedural injustice, though critics warned it could taint India’s reputation as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.​

The Bombay High Court held that when an arbitral tribunal relies on a document, both parties must have meaningful access to it. If the tribunal views an unredacted contract or MoU but a party receives only a heavily redacted version, the audi alteram partem rule is violated. Arbitration may be flexible, but flexibility does not override the duty to ensure equal opportunity to present a case and challenge the opponent’s evidence. Where redactions deprive a party of context and prevent effective rebuttal, the award is procedurally unsound. The Court clarified that confidentiality cannot be used as a sword to secure an arbitral advantage. When confidentiality is invoked, tribunals must adopt proportionate mechanisms, confidentiality rings, targeted disclosure, sealing, or in-camera inspection, rather than withholding vital content. Because the partially-disclosed MoU formed the basis of the tribunal’s findings, the Court set aside the award and remitted the matter, reaffirming that arbitral speed cannot come at the cost of procedural fairness and transparency.

The Chhattisgarh High Court held that when an arbitral award is set aside due to denial of fair hearing, the Court cannot itself re-determine compensation or substitute findings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Instead, it must remand the matter to the arbitrator to cure the procedural defect and reconsider the case in accordance with law. The Court relied on NHAI v. P. Nagaraju (2022) 15 SCC 1 and the Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986, reiterating that modification of awards by courts remains extremely limited; the appropriate remedy where due process is breached is remittal under Section 34(4), not judicial substitution of arbitral reasoning. By reinstating arbitral primacy and minimal judicial intervention, the Court reaffirmed the principle that fairness in procedure is inseparable from arbitral legitimacy, and that courts remain guardians of process, not alternate arbitrators.

The Bombay High Court examined challenges to the validity of an arbitration clause in dual loan agreements executed in 2016 and 2017, where Tata Capital had unilateral power to appoint the arbitrator and discretion to opt out of arbitration in favour of SARFAESI or DRT remedies. The respondents argued that the clause lacked mutuality and that invocation of SARFAESI barred arbitration.

The Court upheld the petitions, holding that the one-sided opt-out clause must be read down to preserve the validity of the arbitration agreement and that simultaneous invocation of SARFAESI and arbitration is legally permissible, given their distinct statutory purposes. The Court further observed that the earlier arbitration had lapsed due to the now-impermissible unilateral appointment, as clarified in Perkins Eastman, but a fresh reference under Section 11 was maintainable. Reaffirming the limited scope of scrutiny under Section 11(6A), it appointed a sole arbitrator, leaving issues of jurisdiction and validity to the tribunal under Section 16.

The Delhi High Court considered an appeal under Section 37 against a Single Judge’s decision upholding an arbitral award in favour of the contractor. The appellant contended that the arbitrator had exceeded his mandate and misconstrued key contractual clauses governing maintenance obligations.

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 is narrow and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or reinterpretation of contractual terms. As the award reflected a plausible and reasoned view, it was neither perverse nor patently illegal. The Court emphasized that arbitral autonomy must be respected and that mere disagreement with the arbitrator’s interpretation cannot ground interference.

In an appeal under Section 37, Techno Aircon challenged the dismissal of its Section 34 petition against an arbitral award that largely favoured ABB. The appellant alleged that the arbitrator ignored material evidence and misconstrued contractual obligations relating to supply and installation works.

The Delhi High Court upheld the award, reiterating that interference with arbitral findings is justified only where the award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or violation of natural justice. Since the arbitrator’s conclusions were based on a rational appreciation of evidence, the Bench refused to reopen the merits. The ruling reaffirmed the principle of minimal judicial intervention and underscored that arbitral awards, if reasoned and plausible, must attain finality.

The Allahabad High Court held that the Commercial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act by setting aside the entire arbitral award despite the Union of India’s challenge being confined to only a few specific claims. The Court found that the Commercial Court’s order reflected a total non-application of mind, as it addressed only part of the issues under challenge and ignored others altogether.

Reiterating the principle of limited judicial interference in arbitral awards, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Commercial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

The Madras High Court, in this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, upheld the arbitral tribunal’s award in favour of the contractor and dismissed TANTRANSCO’s challenge. The Court held that interference under Sections 34 and 37 is permissible only on narrow grounds such as patent illegality or violation of public policy, and not for re-appreciating evidence or substituting factual findings of the arbitrator.

Reiterating the principle of minimal judicial intervention, the Bench observed that the arbitral tribunal had properly assessed contractual terms, delay factors, and quantification of claims, and its reasoning could not be termed perverse or arbitrary. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the arbitral award was affirmed as valid and enforceable.

The Gujarat High Court, dealing with a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, held that once the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is established and the disputes fall within its scope, the Court’s role is strictly confined to a prima facie examination under Section 11(6A). The Bench emphasized that issues regarding breach, performance, or interpretation of contractual clauses are matters for the arbitral tribunal, not for judicial determination at the appointment stage.

Accordingly, the Court appointed an independent sole arbitrator, reiterating the principle of minimal judicial intervention and affirming that arbitral autonomy must be respected unless the arbitration clause is manifestly invalid.

The Delhi High Court, while hearing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, reaffirmed that the scope of interference with arbitral awards is extremely limited. The Court held that arbitral awards cannot be set aside merely because another view on facts or interpretation of the contract is possible.It emphasized that under Sections 34 and 37, courts may intervene only in cases of patent illegality, perversity, or violation of public policy, and not for re-appreciation of evidence or reassessment of factual findings. Finding no such illegality in the impugned award, the Court upheld the arbitral tribunal’s conclusions and dismissed the appeal, underscoring the principle of judicial restraint and finality of arbitral awards.

The Delhi High Court held that mere financial distress does not constitute a sufficient ground to obtain interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Rescom Mineral Trading supplied coking coal to RINL under a 2023 agreement. On the basis of alleged non-payment, it sought to secure its unadjudicated claim by pointing to RINL’s precarious financial condition. The Court observed that relief under Section 9 must be guided by the principles of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, which demand credible evidence that a respondent is attempting to defeat possible enforcement of an arbitral award. The petitioner had not alleged any such conduct, nor demonstrated risk of asset dissipation.

Relying on Vivek Jain v. PrepLadder Pvt. Ltd. and Natrip Implementation Society v. IVRCL Ltd. , the Court reiterated that although CPC provisions do not strictly apply, their underlying rationale cannot be ignored. Since the petitioner failed to establish the essential three-pronged test: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm, the Court denied interim protection. The judgment defines a clear demarcation between legitimate preservation of assets and pre-emptive debt-securing measures, ensuring that Section 9 acts as a shield for the arbitral process, not as a substitute for money recovery suits.

The Delhi High Court held that an arbitral tribunal can lawfully order transfer of shares in a joint-venture company where such relief stems directly from the parties’ contractual bargain. The dispute arose from a 1998 Shareholders’ Agreement between British investor Roger Shashoua and Indian entrepreneur Mukesh Sharma for the International Trade Expocentre Ltd. After ICC arbitration in London found Sharma in breach and directed share transfers to Shashoua, Sharma resisted enforcement in India, claiming that only company-law tribunals could order such relief as matters of oppression and mismanagement.

This argument was rejected through a distinction being drawn between statutory jurisdiction under the Companies Act and contractual disputes amenable to arbitration. It stressed that equal control and representation were the essence of the joint-venture agreement and that arbitration was the agreed mechanism for resolving deadlocks. Upon finding no conflict with  public policy, the Court upheld enforcement and imposed  costs on the respondents for protracted litigation. The ruling substantiates that arbitral tribunals, both domestic and foreign, may issue effective commercial remedies consistent with the principles of fairness and equity.

The Delhi High Court assessed the circumstances under which anti-arbitration injunctions may be granted against foreign-seated arbitral proceedings. EPIL, a public-sector enterprise, sought to restrain an ICC arbitration seated in Singapore, on the grounds of bias and inadequate disclosure by the arbitrator. The respondent contended that only the Singaporean courts would possess supervisory jurisdiction as the seat of arbitration. However, the Delhi High Court held that while Indian courts usually observe minimal interference when dealing with foreign-seated arbitrations, they may intervene when the proceedings are ‘vexatious, oppressive, or contrary to public policy.

Based on precedents such as ONGC v. Western Co. of North America and UOI v. Dabhol Power Co., it was held that courts retain inherent powers under Sections 9 and 151 CPC to prevent misuse of arbitral process unless expressly barred. The Court described itself as a custodian of civil rights, capable of intervention in extraordinary cases threatening fairness or justice and cautioned against forum shopping. Thus, it expounds the position for PSUs and private parties involved in cross-border arbitrations.

In this Section 11(6) petition, the Delhi High Court held that determining whether non-signatories are bound by an arbitration agreement, and whether it ordinarily falls within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Neosky India and its subsidiary, Throttle Aerospace Systems, alleged that former employees breached non-compete obligations by founding a rival firm, Zulu Defence Systems Pvt. Ltd. Since certain respondents were not signatories to the Shareholders’ or the Non-Compete Agreements, they opposed their reference to arbitration. However, it was observed that the Court’s inquiry at the Section 11 stage is narrowly circumscribed and confined to verifying the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and basic arbitrability.

Holding that deeper questions on implied consent, group-of-companies doctrine, or alter-ego liability require evidence, the Court referred all disputes to arbitration, leaving these issues to the tribunal. It further vacated an earlier interim order under Section 9, noting that the non-compete clause had expired and that post-employment restraints offend Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and Section 27 of the Contract Act. By directing that the Section 9 application be treated as a Section 17 motion before the tribunal, the judgment demonstrates arbitral competence over jurisdictional challenges and limits pre-arbitral judicial interference.

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