By: Aaliya Aziz, Aditya Mishra, Ayansh Gangwar, Khushi Sharath Varma, Prince Yadav, Raunak Dixit, Siddhant Singh, Tarun Kumar, Ujwal Gupta, Yash Agarwal.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, arising from Nigeria’s successful challenge to massive arbitration awards originally rendered in favour of P&ID concerning a failed gas processing project. The High Court had earlier set aside the awards after finding that they were procured through fraud and contrary to public policy, and subsequently ordered costs in Nigeria’s favour. The appellate litigation before the Supreme Court focused on the currency in which such litigation costs should be awarded.
The Court considered whether litigation costs incurred in foreign arbitration-related proceedings should be paid in sterling or Nigerian naira. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the sterling-denominated costs award, recognising that the litigation expenses had genuinely been incurred in that currency and that compensatory principles require reimbursement in the currency of actual loss. The decision reinforces the principle that courts supervising arbitration-related proceedings retain discretion to ensure that costs orders reflect real commercial expenditure rather than theoretical domestic accounting positions.
In this ICSID arbitration, the German investor Hela Schwarz initiated proceedings against China under the Germany–China Bilateral Investment Treaty, alleging unlawful expropriation of land-use rights and industrial property connected with a joint venture in Jinan. The dispute stemmed from governmental redevelopment measures between 2014 and 2016 that allegedly deprived the investor’s subsidiary of its facilities and land rights.
The tribunal addressed jurisdictional objections in detail before proceeding to examine claims of indirect expropriation, denial of justice, and breaches of fair-and-equitable treatment. The award records that the arbitration was conducted pursuant to the ICSID Convention and the 2003 Germany–China BIT, with the claimant seeking restitution or alternatively compensation exceeding €25 million plus interest and costs.
In proceedings administered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Ecuador and Perenco disputed liability arising from environmental counterclaims and treaty-related investment issues linked to oil operations in the Amazon region. The arbitration formed part of a long-running sequence of investor-state disputes concerning hydrocarbon concessions and state environmental regulation.
The tribunal evaluated extensive factual and technical evidence relating to environmental remediation obligations and the allocation of responsibility between state authorities and private operators. The proceedings also addressed jurisdictional issues under the applicable investment treaty framework and the tribunal’s authority to determine environmental liability within investor-state arbitration.
The December 2025 award reflects the continuing trend toward complex environmental counterclaims in investment arbitration and demonstrates tribunals’ increasing readiness to adjudicate environmental compliance issues alongside traditional expropriation or contractual claims.
The DIFC Court of First Instance rejected an attempt to annul and resist enforcement of an arbitral award arising from a consultancy agreement linked to a digital token development project. Following termination of the agreement and non-payment of settlement sums, the claimants commenced arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the original consultancy contract.
The award debtor challenged enforcement on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, arguing that the claims relied on a later settlement agreement that lacked an arbitration clause. The debtor further invoked public policy objections under the DIFC Arbitration Law and procedural fairness arguments alleging jurisdictional overreach.
The Court dismissed these objections, holding that the arbitration clause in the original consultancy agreement survived termination and continued to provide a valid jurisdictional basis. It reiterated that annulment is exceptional and confined to strictly enumerated statutory grounds, and that public policy cannot be invoked merely because a party disagrees with the tribunal’s conclusions.
The Hong Kong court granted limited leave to appeal on the broader legal question of whether SMS service of arbitration notices sufficiently balances procedural fairness against the efficiency goals of online arbitration systems.
The court recognised that the issue raised questions of general public importance regarding digital arbitration procedures, especially as online dispute resolution platforms become increasingly prevalent in consumer and commercial contexts. Enforcement of the award was stayed pending appellate review of this legal question.
The appellate development highlights the emerging jurisprudential tension between technological innovation in arbitration practice and traditional procedural safeguards.
In October 2025, the Baku Arbitration Centre (BAC) was formally inaugurated during Azerbaijan Arbitration Days 2025. The establishment of BAC represents a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening regional arbitration infrastructure and positioning Azerbaijan as an emerging dispute-resolution hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
The Centre is intended to provide modern arbitration services aligned with international procedural standards while promoting regional commercial confidence and cross-border investment protection frameworks. The initiative reflects broader global trends toward decentralisation of arbitral institutions beyond traditional hubs such as London, Paris, or Singapore.
The creation of BAC signals continuing geographic diversification in international arbitration and the growing institutionalisation of ADR mechanisms in developing commercial jurisdictions.
The English High Court addressed enforcement and jurisdictional objections arising from India’s challenge to enforcement of the USD 1.2 billion arbitral award rendered in favour of Cairn Energy under the India–UK Bilateral Investment Treaty. The underlying dispute concerned retrospective taxation measures imposed by India on a corporate restructuring carried out by the investor in 2006.
In post-award proceedings before the English courts, India resisted enforcement on sovereign immunity grounds and invoked public international law principles to challenge recognition of the award. The Court analysed the scope of state immunity under the UK State Immunity Act 1978 and reaffirmed the pro-enforcement bias embedded in the New York Convention framework.
SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
- Lancor Holdings Ltd. v. Prem Kumar Menon
In, M/s Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem Kumar Menon & Ors., 2025, the Supreme Court held that mere delay in pronouncing an arbitral award was not enough to justify the setting aside of such an award; instead, each case had to be judged on its own facts to ascertain whether such delay had impacted the arbitral tribunal’s findings in such a manner as to vitiate the award. It was clarified that only where the effect of undue delay, particularly when unexplained, is apparent on the face of the award and reflects adversely on the decision-making process, can such delay be construed as rendering the award in conflict with the public policy of India or vitiated by patent illegality. It was further held that an aggrieved party doesn’t need to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act as a condition precedent to challenging a delayed and tainted award under Section 34. Emphasizing that the very foundation of arbitration rests on expeditious and effective resolution of disputes, it was observed that an unworkable arbitral award which neither finally resolves disputes nor avoids further litigation, while simultaneously and irrevocably altering the parties’ positions, defeats this objective and is therefore liable to be set aside as being opposed to public policy and patently illegal. It was also held that where the conditions for exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution are satisfied, such jurisdiction may be justifiably exercised in accordance with the principles laid down in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 INSC 605.
- Offshore Infrastructures Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
In Offshore Infrastructures Limited v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2147), the Supreme Court of India held that merely because the procedure to appoint an arbitrator provided in the clause has become inoperative due to subsequent changes in statutory provisions, it would not mean that the core of the contract referring the dispute for adjudication to an arbitrator would be rendered nugatory.
The arbitration clause had empowered the Managing Director or his nominee to act as sole arbitrator; however, after the 2015 amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (particularly Section 12(5)), such persons became ineligible. The Court ruled that the arbitration agreement must be interpreted purposively to preserve the parties’ intention to resolve disputes through arbitration rather than defeat it on technical grounds.
On limitation, although the application under Section 11(6) appeared time-barred, the Court granted the benefit of the COVID-19 limitation extension orders (excluding 15-03-2020 to 28-02-2022). After such exclusion, the application was within the limitations. The High Court’s order was set aside, and the matter was referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre for the appointment of an independent arbitrator.
- Alan Mervyn Arthur Stephenson v. J. Xavier Jayarajan
In Alan Mervyn Arthur Stephenson v. J. Xavier Jayarajan (Arbitration Petition No. 21 of 2025, decided on 14 October 2025), the Supreme Court of India dismissed a petition filed under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of an arbitrator.
The dispute arose out of a partnership agreement dated 20.09.2014, which contained an arbitration clause. The petitioner alleged that he had paid substantial amounts (over ₹2.31 crores) for a real estate venture and sought recovery due to non-performance. However, the Court found that the amounts were paid before 04.05.2016 and that even if the limitation was computed from the last alleged payment dated 04.08.2017, the notice invoking arbitration issued on 09.12.2020 was beyond the three-year limitation period.
The Court noted that criminal proceedings had commenced in 2017 and that the claims were time-barred when arbitration was invoked. In addition, the notice and the section 11 application were filed beyond the limitation, and the petition was dismissed as hopelessly time-barred.
The case arose from a long-term Agreement for the supply of certain quantities of freshly mined and washed coking coal between MMTC Ltd., a Government of India enterprise, and Anglo-American Metallurgical Coal (P) Ltd. (AAMC), an Australian company. The dispute between the parties concerned shipments in the fifth delivery period (occurring between 01.07.2008 and 30.06.2009). AAMC was able to supply the coal at the contracted price, but MMTC failed to lift the coal, citing the global financial crisis and market slump as the reason for the same. AAMC invoked arbitration proceedings in 2012.
In 2014, the arbitration Tribunal in its majority award held that no breach was committed by AAMC, rather that MMTC was in breach of its obligations. Anglo was awarded 78.72 million USD. The Majority Award was then challenged under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the appellant, but the Delhi High Court rejected the challenge. In 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the Majority Award.
MMTC then raised a plea of fraud during execution proceedings, seeking a stay of enforcement, arguing that its officials had conspired with AAMC in 2008 to fix an inflated price for coking coal and that the fraud rendered the contract and subsequent arbitral award null.
The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan examined the tenability of these claims. The Supreme Court dismissed MMTC’s objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its application under Order XXI Rule 29, seeking a stay on the enforcement of the arbitral award. The Court held that the decisions taken by MMTC’s officials in 2008 were reasonable and that the Appellant failed to prove fraud. Relying on Electrosteel Steel Limited v. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited, the Court held that belated allegations of conspiracy or fraud could not be credited to reopen or obstruct the enforcement of an arbitral award which had already been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Further, the court held that at the stage of execution, an objection as to the executability of the decree can only be raised on the grounds of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness, and that errors of facts and law cannot be the subject matter of objections under Section 47.
The Court added that, “It should be pointed out that, in the present case, the objection is not based on the ground of any inherent lack of jurisdiction. What is really argued is that the Officials of MMTC committed fraud on MMTC, their employer and there was collusion and conspiracy between the Officials of MMTC and Anglo in pegging the price at US$ 300 PMT for the 5th delivery period. So, the argument on inexecutability of the decree was based on fraud committed by the Officials of MMTC on MMTC, by collusion and conspiracy resulting in a favourable Award for Anglo. It is also argued that fraud was discovered only after the Award was upheld by this Court.”
The Supreme Court upheld the 24% interest charge under an arbitral award arising from a commercial loan transaction, holding that an agreed-upon interest rate in a financial transaction does not breach the public policy of India by virtue of appearing to be incredibly high, nor can it be held to violate the fundamental law of India unless it can be shown to be so unconscionable, or shocking to the conscience of the court as to justify review under Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The case arose from two loan agreements executed in 2006 between Sri Lakshmi Hotel (P) Ltd., a hotel business, and Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., a registered Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC). The loans were made for commercial purposes to pay off bank dues, which together totalled ₹ 1.57 crore. The appellants paid approximately ₹44.6 lakh prior to their complete default from April 2007; a later check in 2008 for ₹1.89 crores for the settlement, too, was returned due to insufficient funds.
Following this, arbitration proceedings were initiated due to a substantial period of default. The sole arbitrator, after considering the evidence, found in favour of Sriram City Union Finance and awarded ₹2.21 crore, with interest at the agreed rate of 24% from the date of the award, and pre-award interest. Sri Lakshmi Hotel (P) Ltd. challenged the award under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, contending that the high interest rate was unconscionable and contrary to public policy.
The bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan upheld the interest, stating that, “It is well-settled that fundamental policy of Indian law does not refer to violation of any Statute but fundamental principles on which Indian law is founded. Any difference or controversy as to rate of interest clearly falls outside the scope of challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India unless it is evident that the rate of interest awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the Court sans which no interference is warranted in the award, whereby interest is awarded by the Arbitrator.”
The Supreme Court dismissed a plea by Balaji Steel Trade seeking the appointment of an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration. The court stated that once the principal contract between the parties is governed by foreign law and provides for foreign-seated arbitration, Indian courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate it.
The case arose when Balaji Steel Trade, an Indian Company, signed a contract with West African enterprise Fludor Benin to establish, manufacture and supply cottonseed cake. The Contract stated that any disputes would be decided by the Centre d’Arbitrage de Médiation et de Conciliation de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie du Bénin (CAMEC-CCIB) and, subsequently, via an agreement, that Benin would be the place of arbitration for both parties. Subsequent agreements were entered into with UAE-based Vink Corporation DMCC and Tropical Industries International to assist with shipments and address certain supply shortfalls, naming Delhi as the seat of arbitration, but were ancillary to the mother agreement between Fludor and Balaji.
The Court rejected the notion that later contracts held that Delhi was to be the seat of arbitration, holding that the BSA between Balaji and Fludor was the principal contract, with the later agreements merely executed specific shipments. Since the alleged breach of contract with Balaji was with Fludor, Benin was the place of jurisdiction.
The bench comprising Justices Narasimha and Chandurkar held that “Indian courts have no jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator for a foreign-seated arbitration, irrespective of the nationality or domicile of the parties”. Further, relying on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., and BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd., the Supreme Court stated that Part I of the Arbitration Act, including Section 11, does not apply to foreign-seated arbitrations, and that once a foreign seat is chosen, Indian Courts cannot appoint arbitrators for the dispute of the same.
The case arose from a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Popular Caterers, a partnership firm engaged in the catering business, and Maple Leaf Enterprises (LLP) and its five promoters for catering at Mumbai’s Tulip Star Hotel in Juhu. Under the arrangement, the caterer agreed to pay an adjustable, interest-free security deposit of ₹8 crore, of which ₹4 crore was paid upfront and received by Maple Leaf Enterprises.
The arrangement collapsed quickly when the Mumbai Suburban Collector barred the hotel from hosting events; the remaining amount remained unpaid, as the contract became unworkable, and Popular Caterers initiated arbitral proceedings. The sole arbitrator appointed by the Bombay High Court directed Maple Leaf’s promoters to refund the deposit with 9% interest. The respondents challenged the award under Section 34 and sought a stay under Sections 36(2) and (3).
The Bombay High Court admitted the petition and granted an unconditional stay, preventing the recovery of the amount by Popular Caterers, who moved to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s decision, finding that the case fell short of the threshold for invoking an unconditional stay of execution of an award, as per the conditions laid down in Lifestyle Equities C.V. and Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc. those being that: (i) The decree passed is egregiously perverse, (ii) is riddled with patent illegalities, (iii) is facially untenable; and/or (iv) such other exceptional causes similar in nature.
The court held that the requirement to deposit the security amount was justified and could not be stayed as the award was not shown to have been induced or tainted by fraud, illegality or corruption, adding that “The case in hand does not fall in any of the aforesaid categories so as to seek the benefit of unconditional stay of the arbitral award which is in the form of a money-decree.” As such, the appeal was permitted.
The case arose in a 2014 bridge construction contract between Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) and Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd (BRPNNL). This contract contained an arbitration clause (clause 25). Conflicts arose during the execution of the works, and two separate arbitration proceedings were initiated.
The first stage of proceedings culminated in an award that BRPNNL fully accepted and implemented without challenge, and the conduct of both parties established that Clause 25 was a valid arbitration agreement executed by the parties.
The second wave of disputes then arose concerning the extended period of the same contract and led to the invocation of clause 25. When BRPNNL failed to appoint an arbitrator, the Patna High Court appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 11. After three years of active participation, BRPNNL filed a review petition before the Patna High Court, challenging the very existence of the Arbitration Clause and seeking the recall of the Order appointing the arbitrator. The Patna High Court not only halted the ongoing arbitral proceedings, which were close to completion, but also dismissed the section 11 petition, effectively undoing the arbitration. As such, HCC approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court found that there exists no discretionary power of “review” after the decision of the appointment of an arbitrator by the High Court under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Justices Pardiwala and Mahadevan observed that seeking review or appeal is wholly impermissible after appointment, as it would generate constant litigation, create uncertainty, and undermine the objectives of speed and finality in arbitration. Further, it was held that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 itself provides no mechanism for revising such decisions, leaving no scope for reconsideration of such an appointment.
“Once an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitral process must proceed unhindered. There is no statutory provision for review or appeal from an order under Section 11, which reflects a conscious legislative choice.” Held the Hon’ble Supreme Court, setting aside the Patna High Court’s order, which had allowed the review petition and recalled its earlier appointment of an arbitrator.
The Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v BCL Secure Premises Pvt Ltd reaffirmed a core principle of arbitration law by holding that a mere legal or connection is not sufficient for a non-signatory to claim under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Setting aside the Bombay High Court’s order appointment an arbitrator on the Respondent’s application, the apex court held that a non-signatory must have a prima facie to establish that it is a veritable party to the agreement. In the absence of such a showing, the matter cannot be referred to arbitration, nor can the issue be deferred to the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the Act. Background of the dispute Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited issued a tender The tender conditions specifically prohibited subletting, transfer or assignment of the work without prior written consent of HPCL., HPCL issued a purchase order to the successful bidder, M/s AGC Networks Ltd. Subsequently, AGC engaged BCL Secure Premises Pvt Ltd as a sub-vendor for supply and technical services relating to the project HPCL was not a party to this arrangement had no contractual relationship with BCL. Disputes subsequently arose between AGC and BCL. Eventually, a dispute between AGC and BCL was resolved, under which AGC assigned its receivables against HPCL to BCL. Relying on this assignment, BCL issued a notice to HPCL to arbitrate and filed a petition under Section 11(4) before the Bombay High Court. The High Court allowed the petition, appointing an arbitrator while directing that the issue of arbitrability and BCL’s status be decided as a preliminary issue by the arbitral tribunal. HPCL challenged this order before the Supreme Court. The judgment by the highest court is also a deepening of one of the significant facets of post-Cox and Kings jurisprudence. Previously, courts have generally made the non-signatory approach more and more accommodating. However, HPCL v. BCL Secure Premises serves as a reminder that procedural flexibility should not be interpreted as a situation where consent is not necessary. To put it concretely, none of the factors, such as the assignment of receivables, the sub-vendor arrangements, or the commercial proximity, can single-handedly coerce a party who is unwilling to arbitrate.
The Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) classifies how the court should exercise the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”), especially after an award has already survived a Section 34 challenge. The issue arises from a mining and transportation contract between BALCO and contractor Ramesh Kumar Jain for the supply of bauxite. After the initial contracted work was completed, BALCO requested that the contractor continue the work, stating that the rate would be decided “in due course.” In response to this request, the contractor supplied an additional 1.95 MT of bauxite. Subsequently, disputes arose over payment for the extra work and related claims, triggering arbitration under the contract. The sole arbitrator delivered an award granting Jain a total of ₹2.34 crore. BALCO’s challenge under Section 34 was dismissed by the Commercial Court at Raipur. However, in an appeal under Section 37, the Chhattisgarh High Court Set aside the award. Justice Aravind Kumar held that the High Court had be out of order the limited scope of review available under Sections 34 and 37. The Court repeats that arbitral awards are not subject to appellate scrutiny and that courts cannot reweigh evidence or reinterpret contracts merely because another view is possible. The Supreme court ruling reinforces two key principles in Indian arbitration law Firs the doctrine of that quantum meruit under Section 70 can legitimise validly support claims for extra work where the contract is silent on price but the other party has accepted the benefit; and second, that courts must exercise great restraint under Sections 34 and 37, interfere only where an award suffers from serious legal defects, and not merely because a alternative Court view on facts or valuation is possible.
HIGH COURT DEVELOPMENTS
The Telangana High Court has held that the forced shift of the Arbitration Venue without the consent of a party amounts to “perversity” and “a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction,” contrary to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The said case involved a writ petition which challenged a procedural order that changed the venue of the ‘closing hearing’ from New Delhi to IDRC in London without considering the objections of the respondent. The Arbitration Tribunal reasoned that holding the “closing hearing” in London was more cost-effective than in Delhi and thereby passed the impugned order.
The Bench noted that both the Act and the Rules prioritise the convenience and consent of the parties over the convenience of the Arbitration Tribunal. In this case, out of five parties, four were based in India and alternate site preferences were dismissed by the Tribunal.
Importantly, it was also noted that the High Court may interfere if the petitioner can prove the twin requirements of apparent perversity and patent lack of inherent jurisdiction as prescribed by the Supreme Court in the cases Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC and Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. v. Emta Coal Ltd.
Currently, however, the matter lies before the Supreme Court under appeal.
In the said case, the defendants are builders who were appointed to redevelop a housing society under agreements signed in 2014 and 2021. The plaintiff gave loans to the defendants for the security of certain development rights mortgaged by them under the Development Agreement. Subsequently, however, certain loan accounts were identified as Non-Performing Assets, and notices under the SARFESI Act were issued by the plaintiff seeking recovery of outstanding amounts from the defendants under various loan facilities and the enforcement of mortgage rights. The defendants, relying on the fact that the Loan Agreements and Indenture of Mortgage contained an arbitration clause for the resolution of disputes, filed an application under Section 8 for the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator. The matter of controversy in the said case was the arbitrability of the issue of whether a claim of money by a financial institution can be treated as a ‘right in rem’ which has an inherent public interest, thus not being arbitrable.
The Bombay High Court reiterated the ratios in Booz Allen and Vidya and held that a suit for foreclosure or redemption of mortgage property, being a right in rem, could not be dealt with by a private forum and that a civil suit will lie for the enforcement of such right.
The core issue was whether a fresh arbitration could commence while appeals against the earlier order (under section 37 of the 1996 Act) were still pending.
The petitioner had paid a security deposit to Shandar Interior Pvt. Ltd. under a salvage purchase agreement. A dispute arose when the Respondent refused to refund the deposit amount. After several rounds of unsuccessful litigation, the dispute was eventually referred to arbitration. The first arbitral tribunal dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it was barred by limitation, though it held that the underlying agreement between the parties was valid and binding. This was challenged under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. While the Court held that the arbitral tribunal had erred in its decision, it also clarified that it was beyond its jurisdiction to modify or re-adjudicate the same. Consequently, the award was set aside, and the plaintiff was permitted to pursue a fresh (de novo) arbitration.
Thereafter, both parties appealed under Section 37 of the Act against the Section 34 order. Simultaneously, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 11 seeking the appointment of a new arbitrator to commence fresh arbitral proceedings.
The Bombay High Court held that pendency of an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) does not prohibit a party from initiating a fresh round of arbitration when an earlier arbitral award has already been set aside.
It was held that “the Section 11 Court ought not to venture beyond examining the existence of an arbitration agreement. The pendency of any proceeding mentioned hereinabove cannot be an impediment to appoint an arbitrator in this Application.” This reiterated the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Wadhwa Group Holdings Private Limited, where the arbitrator had been appointed while the first arbitration was pending.
The Orissa High Court barred objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure from being raised in the enforcement proceeding of an arbitral award, as enunciated under the provisions of Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
While bringing clarity as to the applicability of Section 47 of CPC to arbitral proceedings, the Court held that allowing such objections would undermine the finality and binding nature of arbitration awards and would subject arbitral awards to the same procedural complexities and delays associated with court proceedings, defeating the entire purpose of choosing arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The Bombay High Court examined the legality of compulsory acquisition of private land under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. The petitioner, NESCO Limited, challenged the State Government’s decision to acquire its land situated at Goregaon (East) for slum rehabilitation purposes, contending that the statutory safeguards and preferential redevelopment rights available to landowners under the Slum Act were completely disregarded.
The Court observed that before invoking powers of compulsory acquisition under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act, the authorities were mandatorily required to invite the landowner to submit a redevelopment proposal under Section 13(1). In the present case, no such opportunity was granted to the petitioner, nor was any meaningful hearing afforded. The Court further noted that the acquisition process was undertaken in a mechanical manner, without application of mind, and the compensation awarded was wholly inadequate.
The Division Bench held that deprivation of property without adherence to statutory procedure violates Article 300A of the Constitution. It was emphasized that the Slum Act cannot be used as an instrument to bypass constitutional protections or to arbitrarily dispossess private landowners. Consequently, the acquisition notification, the award passed by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, and all consequential actions were quashed and set aside.
The Bombay High Court examined whether a subsequent developer, who was not a signatory to the original development agreement, could be treated as a “veritable party” to the arbitration agreement. The original development agreement containing an arbitration clause was terminated in 2019, following which a new developer was appointed by the housing society.
The petitioners sought to include the subsequent developer in arbitral proceedings by invoking Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It was contended that the new developer had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting party. The Court reiterated that arbitration is founded on consent and that a non-signatory cannot be compelled to arbitrate unless a close and demonstrable relationship with the contract is established. The doctrines permitting joinder of non-signatories apply only where there is common ownership, control, management, or a composite transaction.
In the present case, the Court found no assignment, novation, or factual basis to treat the subsequent developer as a veritable party. It was held that expanding arbitration agreements to unrelated third parties would undermine the consensual nature of arbitration. The Court held that the subsequent developer could not be compelled to participate in arbitration. However, arbitration between the original parties was permitted to proceed, and a sole arbitrator was appointed accordingly.
The Delhi High Court held that the scope of court scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is limited to examining the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and whether the application is within the limitation period.
In casu, the dispute arose after parties entered into a settlement agreement that culminated in a consent arbitral award, following which fresh disputes emerged which concerned the allocation of carpet area and the execution of lease deeds. The respondent opposed reference to arbitration on the ground that the disputes stood conclusively settled and were barred by res judicata. The Court rejected this contention and held that where the settlement agreement or consent award itself contains an arbitration clause governing future disputes, subsequent disputes that arise from or in connection with such a settlement would remain arbitrable.
The Court also held that issues relating to res judicata, arbitrability, accord and satisfaction, and the binding nature of arbitration agreements on non-signatories require detailed examination of facts and fall within the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 16. The Court laid emphasis on the principle of minimal judicial interference at the pre-arbitral stage and appointed a sole arbitrator and directed that interim relief proceedings be treated as an application before the tribunal.
The Delhi High Court held that where parties have expressly designated a foreign seat of arbitration, Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be excluded, and Indian courts lack supervisory jurisdiction to entertain a challenge under Section 34 of the Act. The appeal arose from the dismissal of a Section 34 petition on the ground that the arbitral proceedings were seated in London and governed by ICC Rules, which thereby excluded the applicability of Part I.
In casu, disputes arose out of a Supply Contract and a Maintenance Services Agreement executed between the parties in relation to the Airport Metro Express Line project. The arbitral tribunal seated in London passed awards in favour of the respondents, following which the appellant sought to challenge the awards before the Delhi High Court. The appellant contended that Indian law governed the contract and that Part I of the Act applied, whereas the respondents argued that London constituted the seat and that Part I was expressly and by necessary implication excluded.
The Court held that the express designation of London as the seat, coupled with the adoption of ICC Rules and the express exclusion of Part I in the Maintenance Services Agreement, showed a clear intention to exclude Indian supervisory jurisdiction. The Court held that challenges to the award lay exclusively before courts at the seat of arbitration and dismissed the appeal.
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